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SIZING UP A MULTI-PARTY TORTFEASOR SUIT IN ARKANSAS: A
TALE OF TWO LAWS-HOW FAULT IS, AND SHOULD BE,
DISTRIBUTED
Joseph R. Falasco*
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era where lawyers, courts, and politicians have attempted to steer
tort liability damage allocation in a more predictable direction, both the
Arkansas Supreme Court and the General Assembly have recently turned
multi-party tort law into a morass. The supreme court's precedent drasti-
cally changed Arkansas's traditional approach to contribution among tort-
feasors, and the General Assembly's reaction through the Civil Justice Re-
form Act equally nullified prior law.' For claims accruing prior to March
25, 2003, a settlement and release by plaintiffs can cost more than the tradi-
tional pro-rata share of the joint tortfeasor's responsibility; a settlement can
completely absolve other possible defendants of liability.2 For claims accru-
ing after March 24, 2003, a plaintiffs ability to recover through trial has
been severely tempered. The Arkansas Supreme Court has veered from its
traditional approach of fault attribution in joint tortfeasor suits. The court
erred in its interpretation of the law, and a more appropriate reading will be
introduced along with an analysis of how attorneys can approach the multi-
party tortfeasor suits in Arkansas for acts accruing prior to March 25, 2003.
Moreover, the General Assembly created a unique framework for multi-
party tortfeasor suits, and an analysis of the new law will follow.
This article will focus on the historical development of the comparative
fault doctrine in Arkansas and the purposes associated with comparative
fault and settlements. Next, this article will introduce the pertinent line of
cases developing comparative fault and multi-party tortfeasors in Arkansas.
It will then discuss the multiple approaches taken by the Arkansas Supreme
Court and litigants in interpreting seemingly semantic changes in the 1975
language of the Arkansas Comparative Fault Statute. Additionally, this arti-
* J.D., magna cum laude, University of Arkansas School of Law - Fayetteville, 2002;
B.S. with honors, Aeronautical Technology, Arizona State University, 1998. During the
2002-2003 term, Mr. Falasco served as law clerk to the Honorable Annabelle Clinton Imber,
Associate Justice, Arkansas Supreme Court. A great deal of thanks to Robert B Leflar for his
guidance through the early drafts of this article. Recognition also to the staff of the UALR
Law Review for their editorial comments and suggestions.
1. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
2. Traditionally a settlement and release would lower a plaintiffs recovery by a pro-
rata share. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (Michie 1987). Under the new reading of the Ar-
kansas Comparative Fault Statute, the release lowers the percentage of fault a plaintiff can
have and still recover. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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cle proposes a more complete analysis to interpreting the statute. Next, this
article will explore that new law of comparative fault. Through that exami-
nation, this article will explain how strategies and tactics have changed con-
ceptually for suits involving joint tortfeasors and will offer two tools one
can use when dealing with multi-party tort suits in Arkansas. Lastly, this
article will attempt to dissect and explain the General Assembly's new ap-
proach for multi-party tortfeasor suits in Arkansas.
The tools will give the reader both a practical and theoretical means to
use when approaching a multi-party tort suit involving acts accruing prior to
March 25, 2003. The practical tool will show that while the law has ap-
peared to change, practitioners can still achieve substantially similar results
with some planning. The theoretical legal instrument helps a practitioner
develop a strategy and a deep understanding of the problem at hand. In ad-
dition, by dissecting the pertinent sections of the Civil Justice Reform Act,
practitioners will be apprised of the procedural pitfalls that will accompany
multi-party tort suits accruing after March 24, 2003.
This article will suggest that the General Assembly overreacted and
there is a preferable direction for the law of comparative fault in Arkansas;
that is, Arkansas law should return to its established law of fault attribution
in multi-party tortfeasor suits. It will conclude with a discussion of how the
desirable law can be instituted and recommend a return to the Arkansas
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act with amendment.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPARATIVE FAULT DOCTRINE
A. Contributory Negligence: A Germinal Seed and Important Tort Doc-
trine
Contributory negligence served as one of the first stepping-stones on
the doctrinal road that led to what we now call comparative fault. The first
major development was determining that a plaintiff had blameworthy con-
duct.3 Then, in 1809, Butterfield v. Forrester4 laid the foundation of con-
tributory negligence.5 In Butterfield, the plaintiff, while riding a horse on a
public road, was injured by a pole that the defendant laid across the road.
The court directed the jury that if it found the plaintiff was not riding with
ordinary care and that the plaintiff would not have hit the pole had he been
riding with ordinary care, then the jury should find for the defendant. 6
3. HENRY WOODS & BETH DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1:2 (3rd ed. 1996).
4. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
5. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, at § 1:3.
6. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (1809).
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The American courts, in Smith v. Smith,7 adopted the rule of contribu-
tory negligence in a similar case where a horse was injured by a woodpile
placed on the road by the defendant. The plaintiff was charged with the bur-
den of proving an absolute absence of negligence on his part.8 The courts
reasoned it would not aid a person's conduct that did not conform with gen-
erally approved legal standards. 9 Stated more artfully, "[r]elief is denied to
anyone who comes into court under a taint."' 0 Arkansas defined contribu-
tory negligence when the supreme court upheld a jury instruction that
stated, "if the plaintiffs, or either of them, contributed to the negligence, the
defendant was not bound."' 1 While the theory of contributory negligence
was expanding, there was a growing effort to limit this absolute defense,
and a number of exceptions arose in the states.' 2 Professor Leflar13 defined
several limitations to the defense of contributory negligence including death
act cases, attractive nuisance cases, imputed negligence cases, and the last
clear chance cases. 14
B. Comparative Fault: The Tree from an Old Doctrine
In a reaction to the harsh holdings of contributory negligence, the
United States Congress adopted a system of pure comparative negligence in
1908 to cases covering injuries to railroad employees.' 5 Under a pure com-
parative fault theory, a plaintiffs damages are reduced in proportion to her
own fault. 16 Mississippi was the first state to adopt pure comparative negli-
7. 19 Mass. 621 (1824).
8. See Leon Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 U. ILL. L. REV. 36, 125 (1944).
9. See Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 130, 131 (1932).
10. Robert A. Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L.
REV. 1, 3 (Winter 1946-47).
11. Halibut v. Forrest City, 34 Ark. 246, 256 (1879).
12. In a life saving emergency situation, contributory negligence is inapplicable. Brock
v. Peabody Coop. Equity Exch., 352 P.2d 37, 40 (Kan. 1960). It is not applicable when one is
saving valuable property. Liming v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 47 N.W. 66, 68 (Iowa 1890). It does
not apply to intentional torts. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3 at § 1:6. Additionally, it did not
apply under the last clear chance doctrine. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, at § 1:7.
13. Professor Robert A. Leflar was a true legal scholar and educator. He taught for
nearly seventy years with a good portion of that at the University of Arkansas School of
Law. Leflar published on many subjects including contributory negligence and was at the
forefront of the conflicts revolution developing the Leflar Choice Influencing Considera-
tions. For a series of tributes to Professor Robert A. Leflar see generally, 50 ARK. L. REV
407-48.
14. Leflar, supra note 10, at 5-16.
15. 45 USCS §§ 51-60 (West 2002); See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, at § 1:11.
16. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 472
(5th ed. 1984).
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gence for personal injuries in 1910.17 Pure comparative negligence was later
proffered by Dean Prosser in a bill approved by the California State Bar
Association that stated "[i]n all actions hereafter accruing for negligence
resulting in personal injury ... the damages awarded shall be diminished in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the injured person...
,,18
Georgia courts pioneered modified comparative negligence through
statutory interpretation of two statutes, including an 1860 statute.' 9 Under a
modified comparative fault system, the plaintiffs damages are reduced by
his fault; however, he is barred from recovery if his fault is greater than the
defendant's. 20 Some states adopt a modified comparative fault approach
where the plaintiff is barred from recovery if his fault is greater than or
equal to the defendant's. 2' Wisconsin embodied modified comparative neg-
ligence in a statute it enacted in 1931 that required the plaintiff to show his
negligence was "not as great" as the defendant's in order torecover.22 Later,
New Hampshire tailored the modified approach so the plaintiff could still
recover if his fault was determined to be equal to, or less than, the defen-
dant's. 23 Arkansas was the fourth state to follow suit, and it statutorily
adopted a form of comparative negligence.24 It started with the "pure
form" 25 following Dean Prosser's recommendation, and later converted to a
modified plan in 1957.26 In 1975, Arkansas slightly changed the language of
the comparative fault statute to read as it did just prior to the enactment of
the Civil Justice Reform Act.27 The metamorphosis was complete when the
General Assembly passed the Civil Justice Reform Act in 2003.
17. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); see also WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, at
§ 1:11.
18. William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (1953).
19. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-8-291 (1992), 51-11-7 (2000); Christian v. Macon Ry.
& Light Co., 47 S.E. 923, 924 (Ga. 1904) ; See also WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, at
§ 1:11.
20. KEETON, supra note 16, at 473.
21. Id.
22. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997); see WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3 at
§ 4:3.
23. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, at § 4:4.
24. Seeid. §1:11.
25. 1955 Ark. Acts 191. This act was also known as the "Prosser Act" because Dean
Prosser drafted the model act and urged the Arkansas Bar Association to adopt it. See
WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, § 1:11; see generally Address of Dean Prosser to the Arkan-
sas Bar Association, 9 ARK. L. REv. 81.
26. 1957 Ark. Acts 296; see WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, at § 1:11.
27. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122. (LEXIS Supp. 2003). See infra Part IV for a discus-
sion on the language change.
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Comparative fault is an affirmative defense. 28 The burden is on the de-
fendant to establish the plaintiffs fault. 29 When comparing fault with multi-
ple tortfeasors, a court can either apply a pro-rata approach or an appor-
tionment-by-relative-degree approach. 30 The pro-rata approach simply di-
vides the apportionment of fault equally among the parties. 3' For example,
if there were two parties responsible, they would each be fifty percent li-
able, and if there were three parties, they would each be thirty three and a
third percent liable. The apportionment-by-relative-degree, or equitable
distribution approach, apportions a party's fault ("fault-share") 32 relative to
his degree of responsibility.33 For example, if there are two parties-Party 1
and Party 2-and Party 1 is ninety percent at fault and Party 2 is ten percent
at fault, then Party 1 would be responsible for ninety percent of the damages
and Party 2 would be responsible for ten percent. Traditionally, Arkansas
allowed a plaintiff to compare his fault-share to the aggregate fault-share of
all parties responsible.34 Now it appears, however, that for acts accruing
before March 25, 2003, a plaintiff can only compare his fault-share to the
fault-share of actual named defendants. 35 To the contrary, for claims accru-
ing after March 24, 2003, a plaintiff can compare his fault-share to the ag-
gregate fault-share of all tortfeasors.
36
C. Purposes of the Comparative Fault Doctrine and Its Fruit
As comparative fault statutes gained increasing popularity in the states,
certain policies and purposes grew out of the courts to support the move-
ment. First, comparative fault supports justice and fairness by allowing
damage allocation and recovery to be distributed to those who were at
28. See Rogers v. CWR Constr., Inc., 343 Ark. 126, 131, 33 S.W.3d 506, 509 (2000).
See also David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Af-
firmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in
Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (1984).
29. See Robertson, supra note 28.
30. David W. Robertson, Eschewing Ersatz Percentages: A Simplified Vocabulary of
Comparative Fault, 45 ST. Louis. U. L.J. 831, 831 n.3 (2001).
31. See KEETON, supra note 16, § 67 at 476 (labeling the pro-rata method as the equality
rule).
32. The author has adopted the phrase "fault-share" to mean the fault attributable to a
party.
33. See KEETON, supra note 16, § 67 at 476 (labeling the equitable division method as
the comparative contribution).
34. See Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 689, 488 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1972).
35. See NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 343 Ark. 437, 443, 36 S.W.3d 291,
295 (2001); see also infra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
36. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 649, sec. 2 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206 to -212 (LEXIS Supp. 2003)).
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
fault.37 Additionally, comparative fault supports risk spreading where the
damages are distributed among those who caused them.38 Thus, by applying
comparative fault instead of contributory negligence, the resultant awards
seem to be more fairly distributed, as each party is responsible for his re-
spective portion of the damages. Moreover, where a plaintiff is only partly
negligent, he is not forced to absorb the entirety of damages caused by the
defendant. 39 The cost of damages therefore is spread across multiple parties,
which concomitantly reduces the burden any one party must bear.
1. The Fruit of Settlements
Settlements are an important weapon in the litigator's arsenal. They
provide numerous benefits for the client and the lawyer. Perhaps the most
dominant theme in settlement proceedings is money.40 Additionally, courts
look favorably upon settlements, as "[i]t is the policy of the law to encour-
age compromise. ....,41 "Settlements help relieve the strain" caused by an
increasingly litigious society.42 It is important to note that while courts are
aware of the importance of a settlement, they are "intolerant of unreason-
able settlement postures. '' 3
Settlements "bring []finality." 44 Additionally, they can ameliorate
harsh attitudes between plaintiffs and defendants.45 Settlements also offset
the jury factor. A jury, while constrained by a judge,46 could return an un-
predictable, grossly large, or minuscule verdict. In fact the Illinois Institute
for Continuing Legal Education lists the status of parties as an important
pre-trial evaluation.47
37. See Stull v. Ragsdale, 273 Ark. 277, 281, 620 S.W.2d 264, 267 (1981).
38. See id. (post 1975 language change) (citing Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 891, 356
S.W.2d 20, 26 (1962) (pre 1975 language change)); see also FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, 834
F. Supp. 1129, 1144 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (finding that the purpose of the comparative negli-
gence statute is to distribute the total damages among those who caused them).
39. Notably, under modified comparative fault, when a plaintiffs fault share is greater
than fifty percent, he is forced to absorb the entirety of damages. See supra note 20 and ac-
companying text.
40. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 57 (1991). For a great discussion of economic realities in
settling see id. at 58-66.
41. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wood, 242 Ark. 879, 888, 416 S.W.2d 322, 328
(1967).
42. HON. EUGENE F. LYNCH ET AL., NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT § 2:2 (1992).
43. Id.
44. HENRY G. MILLER, ART OF ADVOCACY-SETTLEMENT § 1.01 (1992)
45. See id. § 1.03.
46. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict); see also ARK.
R. Civ. P. 59 (Motion For New Trial).
47. Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education, Evaluation of a Premises Liability
Case for Purposes of Settlement or Trial, Kevin J Conway, James T Newman, Michael
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For example, when the defendant is a large, corporate shopping mall
with a hole in its sidewalk, a jury might strictly construe the defendant's
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect its invitees from falling because
of the hole. On the other hand, a similar jury might hold a defendant home-
owner with a hole in his sidewalk to a less stringent duty of care.48 Thus,
because of the jury factor, a large corporation may be more likely to settle
than a homeowner under the same factual scenario.
Because costs of litigation, including fees for attorneys, court reporters,
subpoenas, experts, exhibits, and documents, can accumulate to an enor-
mous amount in a trial, they must be considered.49 There are also future
litigation costs such as appeals to consider.50 Additionally, plaintiffs coun-
sel must consider liens and the likelihood of recovery from a defendant if a
judgment is entered.51 Moreover, attorneys in settlement procedures should
consider the time value of money. In states where pre-judgment interest is
accruing, a defendant should be more apt to settle, and if the state does not
allow for pre-judgment interest, then plaintiffs should look more to settle-
ment.52 Simply stated, "[1]itigation is complicated, costly, and [time con-
suming as it] can go on for years. 53 Lastly, attorneys working on a contin-
gent fee basis view settlements as economically beneficial even if the total
collected is less than that of going to trial because there is generally less
time and workload involved with procuring a settlement as opposed to go-
ing to trial.
54
In multi-party suits, settlements can be used to fund the expensive ac-
tion against a deeper pocket. This tactic is especially effective when a de-
fendant appears to be judgment proof but is willing to make an out-of-court
settlement.55
Mulvihill, Cooney and Cooney Chicago, § V. A. (10.7).
48. Id.
49. See MILLER, supra note 44, at § 1.03.
50. Id.
51. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 649, sec. 3 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206 to -212 (LEXIS Supp. 2003)) (regu-
lating the extent of joint and several liability based on judgments that are not reasonably
collectible); see also LYNCH, supra note 42, at
§ 3:33.
52. MILLER, supra note 44, at § 1.03. A successful plaintiff in a contract or tort lawsuit
is entitled to the award of pre-judgment interest only if the amount of damages awarded was
definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation at the time the plaintiff suffered the
injury for which he was subsequently awarded damages. Woodline Motor Freight Inc. v.
Troutman Oil Co., 327 Ark. 448, 451-53,938 S.W.2d 565, 567-68 (1997).
53. MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (2d ed.
2000).
54. See KRITZER, supra note 40, at 99-100.
55. This idea has been weakened by 2003 Ark. Acts 649. See infra note 249 and accom-
panying text.
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2. The Fruit of Joint and Several Liability and the Effects of Multi-
party Settlements in Arkansas
Traditionally all defendant tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable
for tort in multi-party injury suits.5 6 With the passage of Act 649, however,
joint and several liability has been altered.57 Regardless, Arkansas gives a
right of contribution among joint tortfeasors.58 That right of contribution is
limited, however, by restricting a party's right of contribution from the joint
tortfeasor until he has paid more than his pro-rata share.59
If a release settlement is entered into, all parties are not automatically
indemnified. Rather, in accordance with the Arkansas Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, the agreement releases the settling party of liability
"but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the
consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which
the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the
consideration paid., 60 For example, if Plaintiff settles with Defendant A for
$20,000 and then a judgment for $100,000 is rendered against Defendant B,
Defendant B's maximum liability will be $80,000 ($100,000 - $20,000). If,
however, the agreement provides for a release of forty percent of the liabil-
ity then Defendant B will only be liable for $60,000 ($100,000 - $40,000
(forty percent of $100,000)). Moreover, if the settlement agreement pro-
vides for a release of the settling defendant's "pro rata" share, then Defen-
dant B will only be liable for $50,000 ($100,000 - (100,000 / 2)).6I
Additionally, the settling party does not maintain a right of contribu-
tion against any other tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the
settlement.62 For example, if Defendant A settles for $20,000, and at trial
the jury determines Defendant A's fault-share is ten percent and Defendant
B's fault share is ninety percent and that the total damages are $100,000,
Defendant A does not have a right of contribution for $10,000 ($20,000 -
56. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-201 (Michie 1987). Each tortfeasor contributed to the
proximate cause of the damages. See A.M.I. CIVIL 4th 2110 (West 1999). The joint and
several liability is for the total comparative responsibility of the tortfeasors. See RESTATE-
MENT THIRD OF TORTS § 15, comment a (2000). Joint and several liability has also been con-
sidered to be economically efficient. See Louis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing
Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831, 851 (1989); William M. Landers
& Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 517, 549 (1980).
57. See infra Part VII.
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-202(1) (Michie 1987).
59. Id. § 16-61-202(2).
60. Id. § 16-61-204 (Michie 1987).
61. To determine a party's "pro rata" share mathematically, you divide the total dam-
ages by the number of tortfeasors (Amount of Damages / Number of Tortfeasors).
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-202(3).
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$10,000 (ten percent of $100,000)) against Defendant B even though De-
fendant A paid more than his equitable share.
In order to protect himself from the right of contribution from a non-
settling party, however, the settling party will state that the reduction, if
greater than the settlement, will be equal to his pro rata share in the damages
recoverable by the plaintiff; otherwise the settling party risks being subject
to the non-settling party's right of contribution.63 For example, assume first
that the settlement only provides for a release of the consideration paid,
$20,000 in our example. If a judgment for $100,000 is rendered against De-
fendant B and the jury finds that Defendant A's fault-share was ninety per-
cent, then Defendant B will have a right of contribution against Defendant
A for $70,000. To get to this number you first find that Defendant B is only
personally liable for ten percent of the judgment ($10,000) and that because
of the settlement, his joint and several liability is only $80,000 ($100,000 -
$20,000 (settlement money)). Next you find the difference in Defendant B's
joint and several liability and his personal liability ($80,000 - $10,000)
which equals $70,000.
The pro rata share does not take into account the fault-share of the tort-
feasor. 64 However, Arkansas allows for equitable distribution of fault to
substitute for the pro rata share in determining the rights of contribution
"when there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to
render inequitable an equal distribution among them of the common liability
by contribution ....,,65
III. A METAMORPHOSIS: SUBSTANTIVE FACTS OF THE PERTINENT CASE
LAW
A. Substantive Facts of Walton v. Tull (1962)
Walton v. Tull, 66 an opinion penned by the late Justice George Rose
Smith, is the seminal case interpreting the Arkansas Comparative Fault stat-
ute. In Walton, plaintiff Tull, a passenger in a car, brought suit against his
driver, Walton, and the driver of an oncoming automobile, Brigham.6 7 The
two cars collided after Walton tried to pass Brigham while Brigham was
trying to make a left hand turn.68 After the collision, while Tull was exiting
the car, a third vehicle driven by a drunk Glenn struck Tull's door and in-
jured Tull.
63. See id. §16-61-205 (Michie 1987).
64. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
65. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-202(4).
66. 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
67. Id. at 883-84, 356 S.W.2d at 21.
68. Id.
2004)
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The jury found that Walton was sixty-six percent at fault and that
Brigham was thirty-four percent at fault for the first collision.69 Addition-
ally, with respect to the second collision, the jury assigned sixty percent of
the negligence to Glenn, twenty percent to Walton, ten percent to Brigham,
and ten percent to Tull.70 Although Glenn settled with Tull, he was still pe-
cuniarily interested as he had liability to Walton for contribution.71
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the purpose of the Arkansas
Comparative Fault statute was to distribute the total damages among all
those who caused them and that a plaintiff whose own negligence is less
than fifty percent can recover against any defendant at fault.
72
B. Substantive Facts of Riddell v. Little (1972)
In Riddell v. Little,73 Little, a crop dusting flagman, was killed when he
was struck by a crop dusting plane piloted by defendant Riddell. 74 The es-
tate of Little alleged that Riddell was flying "at too low an altitude under the
circumstances" and "failed to keep a proper lookout for ... Little., 75 Little's
estate also alleged that Riddell's employer, McGraw, knew or should have
known of Riddell's incompetence to be a crop duster and, thus, was liable
for the negligent employment of Riddell.76
After trial, the jury concluded that pilot Riddell was seventy percent at
fault, the flagman, Little, was twenty percent at fault, and the former em-
ployer, McGraw, was ten percent at fault. The trial judge rendered a
$72,000 judgment against Riddell and McGraw jointly and severally.77 In
affirming the lower court, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the pur-
pose of the comparative fault statute was "to distribute the total damages
among those who cause them. . . ," and that "if plaintiff's negligence is less
than fifty percent, [then plaintiff] is entitled to recover from each or all of
them as joint tortfeasors even though the plaintiff's [own] negligence [may]
equal... or exceed... that of a particular co-defendant.,
78
69. Id. at 884, 356 S.W.2d at 21.
70. Id. at 885, 356 S.W.2d at 21.
71. Id., 356 S.W.2d at 22.
72. Walton, 234 Ark. at 893-94, 356 S.W.2d at 26-27.
73. 253 Ark. 686, 488 S.W.2d 34 (1972).
74. Id. at 687, 488 S.W.2d at 35.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 687-88, 488 S.W.2d at 35.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 689, 488 S.W.2d at 36. The court relied on Walton v. Tull, discussed infra at
text with notes 66-72, and stated that because the legislature did not amend the Comparative
Fault Act after having several opportunities, the court would adhere to the interpretation of
the Act from Walton. id. The Act was subsequently amended in 1973, however, not to
change the substantive law, instead, the new Act merely employed a new vernacular. See
[Vol. 26
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C. Substantive Facts of NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc. 7 9
On January 24, 1994, a fire was started by a space heater that ignited
papers on the fourteenth floor of the Worthen National Bank of Arkansas
building. The fire caused severe damage to NationsBank, KPMG Peat
Marwick ("KPMG"), and the law firm of Wright, Lindsey & Jennings. 80
The fourteenth floor was leased to KPMG.8' It was determined that the
space heater that caused the fire was left on either by a KPMG employee or
accidentally turned on by a janitor employed by Laidlaw, Inc., who was
cleaning the office.82
Prior to the suit, the parties stipulated that NationsBank's damages to-
taled $1,635,000, and KPMG's damages totaled $888,600.83 After stipula-
tion, the only complaints left to be resolved were those of plaintiffs
NationsBank and KPMG against defendant Murray Guard. Pursuant to a
jury verdict by interrogatory, the Murray Guard was determined to be thirty
two percent at fault, KPMG twenty one percent at fault, and NationsBank
forty seven percent at fault.84
According to the jury's findings, the Circuit Court of Pulaski County
awarded compensatory damages to KPMG in the amount of $284,352,
which equaled thirty-two percent of the stipulated damages.85 After the jury
verdict, Murray Guard argued that pursuant to Arkansas Code section 16-
64-122 and the jury instructions given, NationsBank could not recover be-
cause it was at greater fault and only sought damages against Murray
Guard.86 The court dismissed the complaint of NationsBank with prejudice,
infra note 116 and accompanying text.
79. 343 Ark. 437, 36 S.W.3d 291 (2001).
80. Id. at 440-41, 36 S.W.3d at 293-94.
81. Id. at 440, 36 S.W.3d at 293.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 441-42, 36 S.W.3d at 294.
84. Id. at 442, 36 S.W. 3d at 294.
85. NationsBank, 343 Ark.. at 442, 36 S.W.3d at 294.
86. Id. at 442-44, 36 S.W.3d at 294-96. The statute states that a complaining party can
only recover against parties from whom relief is sought. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122
(Michie 1987); see infra Part V. NationsBank argued for and Murray Guard opposed Arkan-
sas Model Jury Instruction-Civil 2110 that states:
If you should find that the occurrence was proximately caused by negligence on
the part of a party claiming damages and also by negligence on the part of one or
more of the parties from whom he seeks to recover, then you must compare the
percentage of negligence of these parties.
If the negligence of a party claiming damages was of less degree than the total
negligence of all of those parties he is suing whom you find to be chargeable
with negligence, then he is entitled to recover from them any damages which
you may find he has sustained as a result of the occurrence after you have re-
duced his damages in proportion to the degree of his own negligence.
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stating that it was inconsistent to argue model instruction 211087 to the jury
and then allow NationsBank to recover. The court further reasoned that
because KPMG was not a defendant, Arkansas Code section 16-64-122
would not allow KMPG's fault to be combined with that of Murray Guard.88
NationsBank appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court on the grounds
that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Murray Guard
based on the jury's apportionment of fault.89 In a four-three decision,90 with
Justices Imber and Glaze not sitting, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's ruling stating that "in light of the plain language of the stat-
ute and the events at trial, we cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing
to combine the fault of Murray Guard [with] KPMG." 91 The court held that
section 16-64-122 "in its current form no longer provid[ed] for a compari-
son of fault among all those responsible .... ,92 Rather, a plaintiff can only
compare fault to those parties from whom he sought to recover damages,
and a party with which a plaintiff settled is not a party from which the plain-
tiff sought damages.93
After the decision in Nations Bank, the Arkansas General Assembly
redrafted the comparative fault statute. However, instead of merely altering
the language relied on by the supreme court in that case, 94 the General As-
sembly created an entirely new version of comparative fault.
95
On the other hand, if the negligence of a party claiming damages was equal to or
greater than the total negligence of all of those parties he is suing whom you find
to be chargeable with negligence, then he is not entitled to recover any damages.
A.M.I. CIVIL 4th 2110 (West 1999).
87. A.M.l. CIVIL 4th 2110 (West 1999).
88. Brief and Abstract at 252-53; Brief at Addendum Final Judgment, 3. See infra notes
121-134 for a discussion of how the court came to this conclusion by reliance on a change in
statutory language that had gone unnoticed for almost thirty years.
89. See NationsBank, 343 Ark. at 442, 36 S.W.3d at 294.
90. Justice Imber and Justice Glaze did not participate in the opinion and were replaced
by Special Justice Mazzanti and Special Justice Bailey. Id. at 448, 36 S.W.3d at 298. The two
special justices joined in the majority with Justice Brown and opinion author Justice Corbin,
while Chief Justice Arnold, Justice Thomton, and Justice Hannah dissented. Id.
91. Id. at 444, 36 S.W.3d at 296. The Arkansas Supreme Court also found that counsel
for NationsBank argued to the jury that NationsBank could recover nothing if the jury found
their fault was greater than that of Murray Guard's. Id. The abstract reveals, however, that
counsel was really arguing that if NationsBank's fault was greater than the combined fault of
all other parties then it could not recover. Brief and Abstract at 244. Counsel's following
statement evinces this: "[I]f you put a higher percentage on [the jury interrogatory verdict
form for NationsBank] than you do against Murray Guard and others, then the bank won't
have to pay one thin dime." Id. (emphasis added).
92. NationsBank, 343 Ark. at 443, 36 S.W.3d at 295.
93. See id
94. See infra Part VIII for a proposed alteration.
95. See infra Part VII. For a comparison of Arkansas's tort reform bill and the reform
act proposed by the national conference of commissioners on uniform state laws see Robert
B Leflar, The Civil Justice Reform Act and the Empty Chair, 2003 ARK. LAW NOTEs 67.
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IV. THE OLD LAW: REVIEWING THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE CHANGES
AND THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION CULMINATING IN
NA TIONSBANK
A. The Language
The comparative fault statute of 1975 substantially changed the lan-
guage of the original Arkansas comparative fault statute. The pertinent sec-
tion of the original Act is reproduced below:
Arkansas Act 296 of 1957 Extraordinary Session
SECTION 1. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery of damages
for any injury, property damage or death where the negligence of the
person injured or killed is of less degree than the negligence of any per-
son, firm, or corporation causing such damage.
SECTION 2. In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in
personal injuries or wrongful death or injury to property, the contribu-
tory negligence shall not prevent a recovery where any negligence of the
person so injured, damaged, or killed is of less degree than any negli-
gence of the person, firm, or corporation causing such damage; pro-
vided that where such contributory negligence is shown on the part of
the person injured, damaged or killed, the amount of the recovery shall
• • 96
be diminished in proportion to such contributory negligence.
The 1957 Act was changed slightly in 1973 and the pertinent sections
are reproduced below:
Arkansas Act 303 of 1973
SECTION 1. The word "fault" as used in this Act includes negligence,
wilful [sic] and wanton conduct, supplying of a defective product in an
unreasonably dangerous condition, or any other act or omission or con-
duct actionable in tort.
SECTION 2. Fault chargeable to a party claiming damages shall not bar
recovery of damages for any injury, property damage or death where the
fault of the person injured or killed is of less degree than the fault of any
person, firm, or corporation causing such damages.
SECTION 3. In all actions for damages for personal injuries or wrongful
death or injury to property, fault chargeable to a claiming party shall not
96. 1957 Ark. Acts 256 (Extraordinary Session) (emphasis added).
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prevent a recovery where any fault chargeable to the person so injured,
damaged, or killed is of less degree than any fault of the person, firm, or
corporation causing such damage; provided, that where such fault is
chargeable to the person injured, damaged, or killed, the amount of the
recovery shall be diminished in proportion to such fault.
9 7
The 1975 statute, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-64-
122, reads as follows:
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-64-122
(a) In all actions for damages for personal injuries or wrongful death or
injury to property in which recovery is predicated upon fault, liability
shall be determined by comparing the fault chargeable to a claiming
party with the fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the
claiming party seeks to recover damages.
(b)(l) If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is of a lesser
degree than the fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the
claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is enti-
tled to recover the amount of his damages after they have been dimin-
ished in proportion to the degree of his own fault.
(2) If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is equal to or
greater in degree than any fault chargeable to the party or parties from
whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming
party is not entitled to recover such damages.98
B. Substantive Changes
1. Substantive Changes from 1957 to 1973
First, the 1973 Act added a "Section 1" to define the word fault.99 The
definition of fault simply accommodated the idea of strict liability. Section
2 of the 1973 act is almost the same as Section 1 of the 1957 Act. The only
difference is that the first part of the 1973 Act was reworded to incorporate
the word "fault" instead of "negligence" by replacing each "negligence"
with "fault."'' ° The first part changed from "[c]ontributory negligence" to
"[f]ault chargeable to a party claiming damages.. . ."'0 This change is con-
97. 1973 Ark. Acts 303 (emphasis added).
98. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-122 (LEXIS Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
99. 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
100. Compare 1957 Ark. Acts 296 (Extraordinary Session) with 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
101. Compare 1957 Ark. Act 296 (Extraordinary session) with 1973 Ark. Act 303.
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sistent with the addition of Section 1 in the 1973 statue that defines negli-
gence as part of fault.01 2 Section 3 of the 1973 Act mirrors Section 2 of the
1957 Act. 10 3 The only difference between these two sections of the Acts is
that the grammatical structure of the 1973 Act changed where it was neces-
sary to replace "contributory negligence" with "fault. ' °4 Thus, the only real
substantive change between these Acts actually broadened the scope of the
statute from "contributory negligence" to "fault," which "includes negli-
gence, willful and wanton conduct, supplying of a defective product in an
unreasonably dangerous condition, and any other act or omission or conduct
actionable in tort."'
0 5
2. Substantive Changes from 1973 to 1975
The 1975 Act and the 1973 Act do not mirror each other like that of
the 1973 Act and 1957 Act. The 1973 Act first describes fault, second de-
fines when recovery is barred, and third, defines when recovery is dimin-
ished.10 6 The 1975 Act (1) provides for a determination of liability alloca-
tion, (2) defines when courts will diminish recovery, and (3) defines when
courts will bar recovery.' 07 The first difference between the two structures is
that the 1973 Act does not explicitly provide a means of liability alloca-
tion.'0 8
The 1973 Act simply refers to "fault chargeable to a party" whereas the
1975 Act states that "liability shall be determined by comparing the fault
chargeable to a claiming party with the fault chargeable to the party or par-
ties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages." 0 9 There is
no substantive difference in this language; rather, the 1975 Act just states
how liability will be determined whereas the 1973 Act states when there is
liability.
Another language change with no legal repercussions is the language
used to determine when court will bar recovery. In Section 2, the 1973 Act
uses the words "of less degree" to determine when recovery is barred, and
in Section 3 of the 1975 Act, recovery is barred if "the fault chargeable to a
party claiming damages is equal to or greater in degree.. . . J0 There is no
102. 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
103. Compare 1957 Ark. Acts 296 (Extraordinary session) with 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
104. Compare 1957 Ark. Acts 296 (Extraordinary session) with 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
105. 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
106. 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
107. 1975 Ark. Act 367.
108. Compare 1975 Ark. Acts 367 with 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
109. Compare 1975 Ark. Acts 367 with 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
110. Compare 1975 Ark. Acts 367 with 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
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substantive difference in this language; in either case, if a party is anywhere
from fifty percent to one hundred percent at fault, he cannot recover.
The most significant difference, and the language the NationsBank
court relied on, is the language used to define from whom a party can com-
pare his fault-share to."' In the 1973 Act, a party compares his fault-share
to the fault-share of any "person, firm, or corporation causing such dam-
age," and in the 1975 Act a party compares his fault share to "the party or
parties from whom [he] seeks to recover damages ......
The dilemma spawned by the language metamorphosis from the 1957
Act to the 1975 Act is in determining with whom the plaintiffs can compare
their fault-share. In the 1957 Act, the plaintiffs fault is compared to the
person, firm, or corporation causing the damage. The Arkansas Supreme
Court, in Walton, construed the 1957 Act to mean that a plaintiff could re-
cover from any defendant regardless of their fault-share if the plaintiffs
total fault-share was less than fifty percent. 1 2 Then in 1962, relying on
Walton, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Riddell determined that this lan-
guage allows for the fault to be compared to and aggregated with all parties
at fault.1 1 3 In NationsBank, however, the Supreme Court changed its view
under the 1975 Act, where it held the plaintiff may only compare and ag-
gregate his fault against a party or parties from whom she seeks to recover
damages. 114
The 1975 Act was derived from, and repealed, Arkansas Act 303 of
1973. 1 5 According to the General Assembly, the purpose of the 1973 Act
was to replace "contributory negligence" in the statute with "fault."" 6 Still,
the 1973 language' 17 was consistent with the 1957 Act where it states that a
plaintiffs recovery shall not be barred if it is less than that of the parties
causing such damage." 8 In 1975, however, the structural language of the
statute changed." 9 Thus, the change from "damaging party" to "party from
whom damages are sought" from 1973 to 1975 essentially changed the op-
erative focus of the comparative fault statute in Arkansas. 1
20
111. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
112. Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 893-94, 356 S.W.2d at 21-22 (1962).
113. Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 689, 488 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1972).
114. NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 343 Ark. 437, 443-44, 36 S.W.3d 291,
295 (2001).
115. 1975 Ark. Acts 367 at sec. 4.
116. See House Bill 55, Arkansas Legislative Digest 1973.
117. Compare 1957 Ark. Acts 296 (Extraordinary Session) with 1973 Ark. Acts 303.
118. 1973 Ark. Acts 303 at sec. 2.
119. See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text. Senator Gathright described sec-
tion two as liability being compared to each party and section three as explaining that the
plaintiff can only recover if his fault is less than that of the party from whom damages are
sought. See Senate Bill 66, Arkansas Legislative Digest 1975.
120. Compare House Bill 55, Arkansas Legislative Digest 1973 ("damaging party") with
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Once all this was done, the Arkansas Bar was presented with many un-
answered questions. Was this language change an accident, an oversight, or
a fluke? Did the General Assembly really think they were changing the way
contributory negligence operated in Arkansas? The Arkansas Supreme
Court tried to answer these questions in NationsBank.
C. Analyzing the Language Change of section 16-64-122
1. The First Approach: The Majority Opinion ofNationsBank
The majority court initially looked to Riddell,1 2' a case with similar
procedural alignment. In Riddell the plaintiff sued two defendants. 122 The
jury determined the plaintiff was twenty percent at fault, one defendant ten
percent at fault, and the second defendant seventy percent at fault.' 23 The
court held that if the plaintiffs negligence is less than fifty percent of the
aggregated codefendant's negligence, then he can recover even if her negli-
gence equals or exceeds that of any single defendant.'
24
The court in NationsBank held that Riddell and its progeny 25 are inap-
plicable because the Arkansas General Assembly changed the language of
the comparative fault statute. 26 The court reasoned that the general assem-
bly changed the operative language from "any person, firm, or corporation
causing such damages" to "party or parties from whom the claiming party
seeks to recover damages," and thus the statute no longer allowed compari-
son of fault among all responsible parties. 127 Rather, a jury could only com-
pare the fault-share of the plaintiff to the fault-share of defendants named by
the plaintiff in the complaint; not third-party defendants in the case.1 28 Un-
der the old law, a plaintiff could compare his fault to all parties with a pecu-
niary interest. 1
29
Relying on some general rules of statutory construction, the court rea-
soned that it was giving effect to the "intent of the General Assembly."' 
30
Senate Bill 66, Arkansas Legislative Digest 1975 ("party from whom damages are sought").
121. Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 488 S.W.2d 34 (1972).
122. See generally id. at 687, 488 S.W.2d at 35.
123. Id. at 688, 488 S.W.2d at 36.
124. Id. at 689, 488 S.W.2d at 36.
125. See Parker v. Holder, 315 Ark. 307, 867 S.W.2d 436 (1993); Ray v. Murphy, 284
Ark. 512, 688 S.W.2d 718 (1985).
126. NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 343 Ark. 437, 443, 36 S.W.3d 291, 295
(2001).
127. Id.
128. See generally id. at 437,36 S.W.3d at 291.
129. See Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 885, 356 S.W.2d 20, 22 (1962).
130. NationsBank, 343 Ark. at 443, 36 S.W.3d at 295 ("The basic rule of statutory con-
struction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly .... [T]he first rule is to
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The court found that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous
with a clear and definite meaning and therefore need not be interpreted.'
31
Additionally, the court found that the settlement between NationsBank and
KPMG did not bring KPMG within the definition of a "party . . . from
whom [NationsBank sought] to recover damages" where the settlement was
the "result of each party being exposed to possible contribution claims"
from Murray Guard. 132 Thus, the court held that because NationsBank did
not seek to recover damages from KPMG, in accordance with the plain lan-
guage of the statute and in consideration of the events at trial, KPMG's
fault-share could not be added to that of Murray Guard's. 33 Moreover, be-
cause the fault of KPMG and Murray Guard could not be combined,
NationsBank's fault-share was greater than Murray Guard's, and, thus,
NationsBank could not recover.'34
2. The Second Approach: The Dissent's and Appellants'Analysis in
NationsBank
The dissent, penned by Justice Thornton, first looked to the traditional
approach to fault comparison in Arkansas over the last thirty years.1 35 Then
the dissent looked to the historical development of comparative fault in Ar-
kansas starting with the "Prosser Act" and culminating in Riddell.136 The
dissent concluded that the legislature never "meant to go any farther than to
deny a recovery to a plaintiff whose negligence was at least fifty percent of
the cause of damage."' 3 7 Additionally, the dissent argued that intent of the
doctrine is to distribute the total liability so that each party bears her fair
share, taking injuries and fault into consideration. 38 The dissenting opinion
construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in
common language. The statute must be construed so that no word is left void or superfluous
and in such a way that meaning and effect is given to every word therein, if possible.") (cita-
tions omitted)..
131. Id.
132. Id. at 444, 36 S.W.3d at 295.
133. Id., 36 S.W.3d at 295. The events at trial that the court appears to be alluding to are
the fact that NationsBank requested the jury instruction on comparative fault that Murray
Guard opposed, which reads: "if the negligence chargeable to a party claiming damages was
equal to or greater in degree than the negligence chargeable to a party from whom he seeks
to recover.., then the party claiming damages is not entitled to recover from that party," and
that NationsBank counsel "argued to the jury that they could recover nothing if the jury
found their fault to be greater than that of Murray Guard's." Id., 36 S.W.3d at 295-96.
134. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (b)(2) (LEXIS Supp. 2003).
135. NationsBank, 343 Ark. at 448, 36 S.W.3d at 298 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 449-50, 36 S.W.3d at 298-99 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 449, 36 S.W.3d at 299 (citing Justice Smith in Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882,
356 S.W.2d 20 (1962)) (Thornton, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (citing Walton, 234 Ark. at 843, 356 S.W.2d at 26 (citing Robert A. Leflar,
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finalized its policy argument by citing to Justice George Rose Smith 139 in
Walton, stating, to go further "would 'be almost a return to the common law
doctrine of contributory negligence."", 140 In Walton, Justice George Rose
Smith gave the following hypothetical in support of his statement:
Suppose that a plaintiff fails to stop his car at a through street and is hit
by a drunken driver traveling at an excessive speed. If the jury attributes
thirty-three and one third per cent of the negligence to the plaintiff for hav-
ing run the stop sign and sixty-six and two thirds per cent to the defendant
the plaintiff recovers the greater part of his damages. This is fair.
But now suppose that upon the same facts it develops that a third per-
son had been negligent in lending his car to the drunken driver. The owner
of the car becomes a joint tortfeasor. The plaintiff may still be found guilty
of thirty-three and one third per cent of the total negligence, for his conduct
has not been changed. But no matter how the jury apportions the other
sixty-six and two thirds per cent the plaintiffs recovery, under Brigham's
theory, is reduced. In fact, if the jury should divide the remaining negli-
gence equally between the owner of the car and the drunken driver the
plaintiff could recover nothing at all! We should be hard put to explain to a
layman why it is that a person hit by a drunken driver can recover if the
wrongdoer was driving his own car but cannot recover if some third person
had also been at fault in lending the car. The plaintiffs conduct is so plainly
identical in both instances that it is only common sense for it to have the
same effect upon his recovery.
41
Second, Justice Thornton looked to the plain language of the statute.
Focusing on the language change from "the negligence of any person, firm,
or corporation causing the damage" to "the fault chargeable to the party or
parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages" the dissent
finds that the legislature could not have intended to overturn the principles
of comparative fault. 
142
Lastly, the dissent interprets the operative language of the statute and
concludes that KPMG was a party from whom NationsBank sought dam-
Comparative Negligence: A Survey for Arkansas Lawyers, 10 ARK. L. REV. 54 (1955)))
(Thornton, J., dissenting).
139. For a great tribute to Justice George Rose Smith see Patrick Emery Longan, Profes-
sionalism on the Appellate Bench: The Life and Example of Justice George Rose Smith of the
Arkansas Supreme Court, 54 ARK. L. REV. 523 (2001).
140. NationsBank, 343 Ark. at 449-50, 36 S.W.3d at 299 (quoting Walton, 234 Ark. at
882, 356 S.W.2d at 20).
141. Walton, 234 Ark. at 894-95, 356 S.W.2d at 26-27.
142. NationsBank, 343 Ark. at 451, 36 S.W.3d at 300 (Thornton, J., dissenting). Justice
Thornton, confounded by how the principle behind the change in language escaped review
for over twenty-five years, found refuge from his "ignorance" in that the policy had eluded
everyone else for the same period. Id.
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ages. 143 The dissent finds that not only had NationsBank sought damages
from KPMG, it had been paid damages, and, thus, the majority's require-
ment of comparing fault to "party or parties from whom damages are
sought" was clearly met.144
Counsel for NationsBank relied on Riddell v. Little, 45 concluding that
the fault of all those responsible for damages should have been combined
and compared to plaintiffs fault share. In Riddell, the court reasoned that
the legislature only meant to deny recovery to a plaintiff when his negli-
gence was at least fifty percent of the cause. 146 Thus, because Nations-
Bank's fault-share was determined to be only forty seven percent, under
Riddell, NationsBank should be entitled to recovery.
Alternatively, and in recognition of the statutory language, Nations-
Bank argued that the settlement between it and KPMG brought KPMG
within the meaning of "parties from whom the claiming party seeks to re-
cover damages .... 47 In essence NationsBank argued that the timing of
when damages are sought should not to be considered; instead, the disposi-
tive question is whether or not damages have been, or are currently being
sought.
3. The Third Approach: The Appellee's Analysis in NationsBank
The appellee relied on the Eighth Circuit case, Hiatt v. Mazda Motor
Corp., 148 to conclude that NationsBank could not aggregate the fault-share
of KPMG and Murray Guard. 149 Hiatt was a products liability action
brought against a vehicle manufacturer and distributor.' 50 The manufacturer
impleaded a third party defendant, Wadlow, and the plaintiff did not amend
his complaint to seek damages against the third party defendant. 5 ' The
plaintiff did not amend his complaint because, if he had, diversity jurisdic-
tion would have been destroyed and the case dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion.152 The Eighth Circuit held that because Hiatt, for his own strategic
reasons, withheld his claim against Wadlow, he did not seek to recover
damages against him, and thus the fault-share of Mazda Motor Corporation
143. Id. at 451-52, 36 S.W.3d at 300.
144. Id. at 452, 36 S.W.3d at 300.
145. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
146. Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 688-89, 488 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1972).
147. NationsBank, 343 Ark. at 444, 36 S.W.3d at 295.
148. 75 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1996).
149. Appellee's Brief and Abstract at 40, citing Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d
1252 (8th Cir. 1996).
150. See generally Hiatt, 75 F.3d at 1252.
151. Id. at 1254.
152. Id. at 1257; see also 15 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 102.20[ 1] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2003).
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and Wadlow could not be combined under the Arkansas comparative fault
statute.1 3 Thus, the appellee reasoned that because Hiatt could not compare
fault to Wadlow where he did not affirmatively assert an action against
Wadlow, 154 NationsBank could not compare fault to KPMG where he was
not a named defendant.
4. A More Complete Analysis
The Arkansas Supreme Court completely changed the way compara-
tive fault operates in Arkansas. The court based this operative change on a
negligible amendment in statutory language. 155 Almost forty years of prece-
dent and substantive understanding have been overruled.156 The change in
statutory language appears to limit recovery based on a comparison between
plaintiffs' and defendants' fault-share. 157 However, the precise language of
the statute is "seeks to recover damages," and this language does not limit
the plaintiff to only comparing his fault share to named defendants. 158 If the
Arkansas General Assembly had intended to limit comparison to solely a
plaintiff and named defendants, then it could have drafted that statute using
"plaintiff[s]" and "defendant[s].' 59
The process of construing a statute requires consideration of more than
one rule of interpretation. The object in construing a statute "is to seek out
and enforce" the intention of the General Assembly. 160 There is little to no
legislative history available to help illuminate the Legislature's intent in
enacting Arkansas statutes. One can hope that a particular hearing was
taped, 161 or look in the Arkansas Legislative Digest for clues. Thus, it is
153. Hiatt, 75 F.3d at 1260.
154. The Hiatt court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) requires the plaintiff
to make an affirmative action against a third-party defendant to maintain a claim. Id. at 1259.
Thus, because Hiatt did not make an affirmative act, he did not have a claim, and thus could
not "seek" damages as the Arkansas comparative fault statute requires. Id. at 1260.
155. See notes 96-120 and accompanying text to compare the language change.
156. See Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962) (operating under the
"Prosser Act" of pure comparative fault); see also Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 488
S.W.2d 34 (1972) (operating under the modified comparative fault act).
157. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
158. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (LEXIS Supp. 2001).
159. The general assembly could have drafted the statute to read "if the fault chargeable
to the plaintiff is equal to or greater in degree than any fault chargeable to any named defen-
dant, then the claiming party is not entitled to recover such damages from that defendant."
See infra Part VII for a recommended statutory amendment.
160. FRANCIS J. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1, at 1 (1953).
161. Some sessions of the Arkansas General Assembly have been taped and can be found
by calling the Office of the Secretary of State. The session, however, in which the Arkansas
Comparative Fault Statute was discussed and adopted was not recorded.
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near impossible to get a sense of Arkansas legislative intent by looking
through historical documents.
The context of an obscure law is a necessary factor to consider when
interpreting a statute.162 Every statute has a literal meaning that incorporates
the commonly accepted connotation of the words.1 63 The Arkansas Com-
parative Fault statute does not appear to be obscure on its face, however,
there have been at least three different views of how the statute should be
applied, and, thus, it is ambiguous at best.164 The literal meaning of the
words "seeks to recover damages" means that a party must be currently
seeking damages. Nevertheless, section (a) of the code, where the words
first appear, is a clause used to simply establish liability. 65 Liability can
only be established if a party is in the suit, and thus, the literal meaning of
the words "seeks to recover damages" which modifies the phrase "liability
shall determined by" can be read consistent with Walton to mean that seek-
ing damages is equivalent to a party with a pecuniary interest. 166 Moreover,
in order to give full effect to the language of the statute, one must compare
the fault of the plaintiff party claiming damages to all those from whom he
seeks to recover damages. When parties settle, they are making allowances
for damages that would be determined in a court of law. Clearly then, one
party is still seeking to recover damages through settlement. Stated more
simply, a settlement is still based on a party seeking and recovering dam-
ages. A party is only maintained as a named defendant when he cannot
come to a settlement of damages consistent with the plaintiffs views.
Moreover, courts presume that the legislature did not intend an unjust
result from a statute. 67 The Arkansas Supreme Court and federal courts
interpreting Arkansas law have consistently determined that the purpose of
the comparative fault statute is to allocate responsibility to all parties at
fault.168 It is well settled that the purpose of comparative fault was to allevi-
ate the harsh results of contributory negligence that barred a plaintiff from
recovery when he was minimally at fault, and replace it with a more just
law. 169 Thus, it is unjust for a party to be barred from recovery simply be-
cause he settles with a tortfeasor or does not name the tortfeasor as a party
162. MCCAFFREY, supra note 160, § 2, at 2.
163. Id. § 3, at 3.
164. See supra Part IV.B.1-3.
165. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2003) (beginning with the phrase,
"liability shall be determined by").
166. See id.; see also Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 893-94, 356 S.W.2d at 26-27
(1962).
167. MCCAFFREY, supra note 160, § 3, at 5.
168. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26
MULTI-PARTY TORTFEASOR SUITS
defendant. Such an analysis is akin to the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence.
In searching for the meaning of a statute, one may look to the history
of the Act. 170 Once the highest court has construed a statute, such construc-
tion is as much part of the statute as the original itself.'7' There is a pre-
sumption that the General Assembly enacts statutes in "accord with settled
principles of public policy. ' 172 The Arkansas Supreme Court has historically
held that the Arkansas Comparative Fault statute was designed to allow
recovery for plaintiffs who were not over fifty percent negligent; that appli-
cation comports with sound public policy.
173
While it is a general rule of statutory construction that language change
in a statute suggests an intent to change the substantive law, in cases where
there is a mere change in phraseology, a law should not be deemed to
change unless there was an evident intention to do SO. 174 The change from
the 1973 Comparative Fault Act to the 1975 Comparative Fault statute was
merely a change in phraseology. The General Assembly did not only change
the wording of how to determine liability, it also changed the wording of
when courts bar recovery. 75 Additionally, the General Assembly did not
articulate a clear intent to change the substantive law of comparative fault in
the 1975 statute. It follows that the wording change for determining liability
was merely a change in phraseology and not a change in the substantive
law.
In interpreting statutory language, a court need not only look to the in-
tent of the general assembly and construe the language as it reads-maybe
this just purports to effectuate the meaning of the statute by giving effect to
the plain meaning of the statutory text-it should also avoid an application
of the language that yields absurd results. 76 Under the comparative fault
policies defined by the Arkansas Supreme Court, interpreting the statute to
bar recovery when a plaintiff is less than fifty percent at fault is absurd.
177
This absurdity is captured by Justice Thornton stating that to go further than
to deny recovery to a plaintiff who is less than fifty percent at fault "would
almost be a return to the common law doctrine of contributory negli-
gence." 78 While this statement may be an exaggeration, Justice George
170. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 160, § 37, at 75.
171. Id. §42, at 79.
172. Id. § 34, at 64.
173. See supra notes 31-88 and accompanying text.
174. MCCAFFREY, supra note 160, § 78, at 155-56.
175. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
176. See Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 494, 996 S.W.2d 20, 24-25 (1999) (giving effect to
the intent of the Arkansas General Assembly and construing it just as it reads); Rineco Chem.
Indust., Inc., v. Weiss, 344 Ark. 118, 124, 40 S.W.3d 257, 262 (2001).
177. See supra Part II.C.
178. NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 343 Ark. 437, 449-50, 36 S.W.3d 291,
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Rose Smith illustrated the application of such a statement and, the point he
makes is clear: the General Assembly never intended for a party who was
less than fifty percent at fault to be denied recovery.' 79 Another absurdity
resulting from the NationsBank ruling is that a tortfeasor can be maintained
in the suit to determine fault-share by suing him for one dollar.' 80
Additional support for allowing the plaintiff to use the fault-share of all
tortfeasors can be found in the Restatement Third of Torts on Apportion-
ment section 16.181 Section 16 suggests the same law Arkansas had prior to
NationsBank, allowing recovery from the non-settling party diminished by
the fault-share of the settling tortfeasor.1
82
V. THE NEW LAW OF COMPARATIVE FAULT IN ARKANSAS FOR ACTS
ACCRUING BEFORE MARCH 25, 2003
In order to efficiently and effectively represent clients, plaintiffs' bar
and defendants' bar will need to change their tactics in suits involving joint
tortfeasors under the NationsBank ruling for acts accruing prior to March
25, 2003.'8 Plaintiffs should be cautious of entering into a settlement with
a joint tortfeasor. If they do enter into a settlement, they should maintain a
right of nominal damages against the joint tortfeasor. By maintaining a right
of nominal damages, the plaintiff can name the settling joint torfeasor as a
defendant and thus combine the settling joint tortfeasor's fault-share with
the fault-share of the "true" defendant. The plaintiff would have a "primary
defendant,"-the tortfeasor from which the plaintiff expects to recover
damages-and a "fault defendant"-the tortfeasor whose fault will be used
to aggregate and allow for recovery. Some agreements like this, however,
have been classified as "Mary Carter" agreements and Arkansas attorneys
need to understand the ramifications of this label. 184
The basis of a "Mary Carter" agreement is an agreement made between
a plaintiff and one or more, but not all, defendants in a multi-party law-
299 (2001) (Thornton, J., dissenting) (citing Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20
(1962)).
179. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
180. See infra Part VI for a discussion on how to sue a settling defendant for nominal
damages.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 56, at § 16 cmt c. (2000) (allowing the
fact finder to assign responsibility to the settling party).
182. See id. § 16.
183. The General Assembly through the Civil Justice Reform Act has introduced a com-
pletely new version of the doctrine of comparative fault. See 2003 Ark. Act 649; see infra
Part VII.
184. For an in depth discussion of "Mary Carter" type agreements, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 56, at § 24, reporter's notes to cmt i.
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suit. 85 The term "Mary Carter" has its genesis in Florida where the agree-
ments seem to be quite popular. 86 The original characteristics of a "Mary
Carter" were: (1) secrecy; (2) the agreeing defendants are maintained as
parties; (3) "the agreeing defendants' liability is decreased in direct propor-
tion to the non-agreeing defendants' increase in liability"; and (4) the agree-
ing defendant guarantees the plaintiff a specified amount of money if a
judgment less than a specified sum is rendered against the non-agreeing
defendant. 187 As "Mary Carter" agreements grew in popularity, however,
the secrecy element dropped out in many jurisdictions where the plaintiff
was forced to reveal the agreement to the jury in order for it to be enforce-
able. 1
88
Arkansas first dealt with the "Mary Carter" agreement in Firestone v.
Little,'89 in which the supreme court held that the plaintiff was required to
reveal the details of the agreement to the jury. On remand, the trial court
gave effect to the "Mary Carter" agreement. That ruling was again appealed
to the Arkansas Supreme Court. 90 In its final adjudication of the issue, the
supreme court held that "Mary Carter" agreements would not be given ef-
fect in Arkansas when they affect the joint and several liability of all the
defendants. 191
185. Katherine Gay, Note, Mary Carter In Arkansas: Settlements, Secret Agreements,
and Some Serious Problems, 36 ARK. L. REv. 570, 570-71 (1983). This note was published
before Shelton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 281 Ark. 100, 662 S.W.2d 473 (1984), which
may have altered the law stated. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
186. See Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); see also
Gay, supra note 185, at 574-75, n.24-27.
187. Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 355 So. 2d 208, 210 (Fla. Ct. App.
1978). While these four elements are part of a "Mary Carter" agreement, other agreements
named loan receipt agreements, sliding scale agreements, guaranty agreements or Gallagher
covenants are similar and contain the operative elements of the defendant remaining party to
the lawsuit and the settling party's financial liability being dependent upon the recovery
against the non-settling defendant. 22 A.L.R. 5th 483, 497-98 (1994).
188. See Gay, supra note 185, at 576, n.30.
189. 276 Ark. 511,639 S.W.2d 726 (1982).
190. Shelton, 281 Ark. at 102-03, 662 S.W.2d at 474-75.
191. Id. at 103, 662 S.W.2d at 475 ("In revising the judgment, the trial court .... gave
application to the 'Mary Carter' agreement . . . to the point that it controlled the joint and
several liability of all the defendants. In this respect the trial court erred. The 'Mary Carter'
agreement should not have been the basis for relieving Shelton of his share of the liability
determined by the jury.").
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VI. PRACTICING UNDER THE NATIONSBANK RULING: TOOLS OF THE TRADE
A. The First Tool: Transforming a "Mary Carter"
After NationsBank, a plaintiff may want to consider using a "Mary
Carter" type of agreement. The agreement should initially be a settlement as
would usually be entered into by the parties. 92 In addition, the agreement
should allow the plaintiff to maintain a right of nominal damages against the
settling party as a named defendant in the case. A "right of nominal dam-
ages" simply means that the plaintiff can name the settling party as a defen-
dant in the case; however, the plaintiff can only recover one dollar from the
settling party regardless of jury award.
This agreement, although not a "Mary Carter" agreement on its face,
has a similar effect. The settling defendant is maintained in the suit; how-
ever, his liability is not contingent upon the non-settling defendant's liabil-
ity. Additionally, while the settling defendant guarantees the plaintiff a sum
of money as specified in the settlement, that number cannot be changed
after a verdict is entered. Thus, this agreement is lacking essential elements
of a "Mary Carter" agreement and would be more appropriately titled a
"Party Maintenance" agreement.
In drafting a "Party Maintenance" agreement, 93 a plaintiff should con-
sider how Arkansas courts will view the contract. The courts may determine
that this agreement is a "Mary Carter" agreement and thus invalid as to the
effect it has on the non-settling party.' 94 The supreme court held in Shelton
that the agreement was invalid because it would effectively alter the joint
and several liabilities of the defendants. 95 The retention of a party with
right of nominal damages, however, does not alter the joint and several li-
abilities of the defendants. If the settling defendant did not follow the Ar-
kansas Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in the settlement, then
he may be exposed to the right of contribution from the non-settling defen-
dant. However, if done properly, the Arkansas Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act legally alters the joint and several liability. 96 Thus
the Shelton rule should not apply, and the "Party Maintenance" agreement
should be effective.
192. The parties should follow the settlement format of the Arkansas Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
193. A model "Party Maintenance" agreement is proposed infra Part VII.
194. Clearly, if the court would not give effect to the "Party Maintenance" agreement,
then under the NationsBank rule, a plaintiff would not be able to aggregate the fault of the
settling and non-settling defendant.
195. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, it is not likely that Arkansas courts will deem a "Party
Maintenance" agreement to be an ineffectual "Mary Carter" agreement.
While the Arkansas courts have not addressed the validity of a "Mary
Carter" agreement as a whole, 197 the policy considerations developed in
invalidating the agreement are nugatory in this context. First, the Shelton
principle does not apply where the "Mary Carter" type provisions of the
agreement do not affect the joint and several liabilities of the defendants.' 98
Next, a "Mary Carter" agreement gives the settling defendant a finan-
cial interest in the outcome of the case and can effectually disrupt the fair
administration of justice. 199 In addition, some courts have found that these
agreements are void as violative of sound public policy where they can
"skew the trial process, mislead the jury, [and] promote unethical collusion.
...9200 A "Party Maintenance" agreement does not carry these attributes as
the Arkansas comparative fault statute allows for a reduction in damages or
right of contribution against the settling party, and the settling defendant is
only in the case to determine the fault-share of respective parties. Further-
more, the existence of a "Party Maintenance" agreement is discoverable and
admissible into evidence, and, thus, is not likely to mislead a jury.201 Sup-
porting this rational, the Restatement (Third) of Torts adds that these settle-
ments can have a legitimate purpose and the unfair aspects can be con-
trolled.2 °2
Admittedly, the "Party Maintenance" agreement brings a host of other
problems. Because the settling defendants have no real interest in the case
they will have no incentive to put on a good faith defense. This can be re-
solved in two ways. First, the plaintiff can require that the settling defendant
make a good faith defense in the settlement agreement. Or second, a Re-
statement approach, because the non-settling defendant has an interest in
showing that the settling defendant was liable, and the Plaintiff has the in-
centive of showing that the non-settling party was most liable, the court can
allow both parties to introduce evidence of the settling defendants' negli-
gence and inform the jury of the settlement and ramifications it has on the
197. See Shelton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 281 Ark. 100, 102, 662 S.W.2d 473,
474 (1984) (denying the effect of "Mary Carter" agreements as they alter the joint and sev-
eral liability of all defendants).
198. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Additionally, the Arkansas Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, absent the "Party Maintenance" clause of the settle-
ment agreement, can alter joint and several liability and the right of contribution. See supra
notes 60 and accompanying text.
199. 22 A.L.R 5th 483; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 56, at § 24,
cmt i.
200. See Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1992); see also 22 A.L.R. 5th 879.
201. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Little, 276 Ark. 511, 515, 639 S.W.2d 726, 728
(1982).
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 56, at § 24, cmt i.
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verdict. 203 Still, the fact finder is required to determine the liability of a de-
fendant that will not be subject to a monetary judgment. This will result in
administrative costs and may confuse the fact-finding process. Additionally,
litigation based on a dispute as to whether a settling defendant made a
"good faith" defense is inevitable. 2° Moreover, if a requirement of a good
faith defense is provided for in the settlement, a defendant is less likely to
enter into a settlement. °5
It is likely that the Arkansas courts will find that while a "Party Main-
tenance" agreement has traits similar to a "Mary Carter" agreement, the
genuine purpose of the "Party Maintenance" agreement overrides the inva-
lidity considerations attributable to the distinguishable "Mary Carter"
agreement.2 °6 The intent of the Arkansas General Assembly has always
been to allow the burden of compensation from a tort action to be spread
across all parties who were at fault. 207 While the language of the Arkansas
comparative fault statute may have changed, the risk spreading policy re-
208mains. 8 Additionally, the "Party Maintenance" agreement allows the jury
to consider all liable parties and attribute such fault accordingly. Moreover,
the retention of a right to nominal damages against the settling defendant
allows the plaintiff to aggregate the fault-share of all other parties by meet-
ing the plain words of the statutory language; this absurd semantic exercise
is necessary only because of the NationsBank rule.
Additionally, in arguing to a jury on interrogatories, plaintiffs' attor-
neys should be careful not to limit their remedies by telling the jury the
plaintiff can only recover if their fault is less than any of the defendants.2 °9
203. For example, defense counsel may want to tell the jury that the plaintiff has already
recovered money from the settling defendant and the only reason he is in the trial is for fault
allocation. Plaintiff's counsel may want to tell the jury that they will be apportioning fault to
all parties; however, the settling defendant will not be paying for the amount of liability
apportioned to him. Rather, plaintiff will only be able to recover from the non-settling party.
The Restatement would make this an issue for the jury to consider. Id. § A19 (2000). The
Restatement's position is that defendant bears the burden of proof for showing there was a
settlement and that it was for the legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Id.
§ 16, cmt f.
204. Part of the problem with "Mary Carter" agreements was that they tended to realign
the parties. The settling defendant had a pecuniary interest in having the plaintiff win, thus
the trial process was skewed where the settling defendant would not try to defend. See supra
note 199 and accompanying text.
205. Settlements will in effect be "chilled" as Justice Thornton warned in his dissent. See
NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc, 343 Ark. 437, 452, 36 S.W.3d 291, 300 (2001)
(Thornton, J., dissenting).
206. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (discussing the bad policies a
"Mary Carter" carries).
207. See Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 892-94, 356 S.W.2d 20, 25-27 (1962).
208. See Stull v. Ragsdale 273 Ark. 277, 281, 620 S.W.2d 264, 267 (1981); see also
supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
209. It appears the court in NationsBank considered the closing arguments to the jury in
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It appears the court gave great weight to what counsel argued to the jury in
NationsBank.21°
As counsel for a potential defendant in cases involving joint tortfea-
sors, attorneys will have to consider the effects of the settlement.2 1 If a po-
tential defendant settles, it may still be required to join in the suit, and, thus,
incur costs of litigation.21 2 However a settlement may still prove beneficial
to the defendant in cases where liability could be enormous. Because the
settling party may still be a defendant, in coming to a settlement, the costs
of making a good faith defense must be considered. These costs, however,
should be fairly ascertainable and the settlement will still essentially cap the
settling party's liability.
If a joint tortfeasor is named as a defendant, defense counsel should
always seek to bring the other joint tortfeasors into the suit. Even if the
other joint tortfeasors are judgment proof, the jury could feasibly draw some
of the fault-share from the defendant and assign it to another joint tortfeasor.
Therefore, there is a greater chance that the defendant will be found to be
less negligent than the plaintiff and thus be absolved of damages under the
NationsBank interpretation of section 16-64-122 of the Arkansas Code.
Consider the following illustrative hypothetical tort involving three
joint tortfeasors A, B, and C, where A is the only party seeking damages. If
a suit only involves A versus B, the jury may look specifically at A's fault
and determine it to be forty percent. B, of course, would be sixty percent at
fault. C is not in the suit and the jury would not have the pertinent informa-
tion or ability to allocate C a percentage of fault. If C, however, was named
and could be allocated fault, the jury may still find the plaintiff to be forty
percent at fault and then split the remaining sixty percent so that B is less
than forty percent at fault, effectively barring the plaintiff from recovery.
Under the old comparative fault law, plaintiffs would recover in the
above hypothetical. There would be no reason for the defendant to bring in
the additional joint tortfeasor C. If C were judgment proof, B would still be
jointly and severally liable.213 If A had entered into a settlement with C,
deciding if NationsBank should be able to recover. In affirming the lower court's judgment,
the supreme court stated "[i]n light of the plain language of the statute and the events at trial,
we cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing to combine the fault of Murray Guard and
KPMG." NationsBank, 343 Ark. at 444, 36 S.W.3d at 296. The court found that NationsBank
argued to the jury that they could recover nothing if the jury found their fault to be greater
than Murray Guard's. Id. The court, however, may have been mistaken as to what counsel
was arguing to the jury. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 200.
211. See infra Part VI.B.
212. Because the party has settled, the level of representation needed at the trial will be
minimal, as they should be essentially indemnified in the settlement.
213. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-61-201 to -203 (Michie 1987); see also Riddell v. Little,
253 Ark. 686, 689, 488 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1972).
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then A would still recover, although his recovery would be diminished by
his pro rata share if the settlement tracked the Arkansas Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act.2t4 Under the NationsBank ruling, because A
was not seeking to recover from C (due to negotiations, etc.), B's fault and
C's fault could not be aggregated. Thus, A would be barred from recovery
as his fault-share would be greater than B's.
A defendant can accomplish the reallocation of fault in three ways: (1)
by bringing in the joint tortfeasors under a theory of contribution; (2) by
bringing a direct claim; or (3) by joining a joint tortfeasor as a necessary
party.215
B. The Second Tool: Game Theory and Multi-Tortfeasor Transactions
Game theory is a way for an attorney to get a good understanding of a
case by mapping out the possible scenarios that may play out. It requires an
attorney to quantify unknown probabilities and apply them to the facts of
the case. Lawyers do this intuitively. For example, when deciding whether
or not to take a tort case on a contingency basis, a lawyer will weigh the
probability of settling the case, getting the case to a jury, winning the case,
and ultimately the possible amount of recovery. In making these considera-
tions, a lawyer is really engaging in Game Theory thinking. The following
explanation sets out the basics of technical Game Theory thinking and how
it can apply to multi-party tortfeasor suits in Arkansas.
1. Terms Defined
Actions: The associated movement of making a choice.
Decision Point: A point in the game when a player is confronted with
more than one choice.
Payoff: What the player stands to gain or lose from the choices made
in a game.
Rational Choice: The choice that inherently brings the best payoff.
Risk Consideration: Unknown variables in the game that can affect a
payoff.
214. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (Michie 1987).
215. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 19.
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Rules: Defines who is playing, what choices are available to the play-
ers, the order of play, and what the associated payoffs are.21 6
Strategy: A strategy is a plan that tells the player what to do at each
decision point requiring the player to make a choice.217
2. Game Theory
Game theory is the study of strategic interactions among actors who
are self-interested and acting in a rational way.21 8 The origins of game the-
ory come from Von Neumans and Morgenstern's The Theory of Games and
Economic Behaviour.219 More precisely stated, game theory is the formal
study of conduct by two or more players that must make choices at decision
points that have a limited number of actions spawning from them.22 °
In any given "game," game theory assumes that all the players know
all the rules and all actions that can be taken at any given decision point.
221
Additionally, the players know the payoffs that are associated with each
game end, and the path of choices leading through each decision point that
develops the necessary strategy to reach a desired payoff.222 Thus players
must develop a strategy that will lead them to their desired payoff.223 The
only uncertainty is that a player cannot predict what choice another oppo-
nent will make.
Let us consider this hypothetical and the following "rules" to the game:
(1) Tort occurs in Arkansas and is governed by Arkansas law; (2) Plaintiff
sues defendants A and B; (3) The suit is worth $100,000: the amount of
damages plaintiff sustained; (4) Plaintiffs fault-share is forty percent; and
(5) A and B's respective fault-shares are thirty percent.
a. Plaintiffs' strategy
The plaintiff has the first move in the game and immediately confronts
a decision point. Plaintiff can either sue or accept the tort. If she sues, she
will move to her next decision point, however if she accepts the tort, then
216. PRAJT K. DUTrA, STRATEGIES AND GAMES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (1999).
217. Id.
218. Stephen W. Salant and Theodore S. Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for
Prime Time?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1839, 1840 (May 1996).
219. Salant & Sims, supra note 218, at 1839 (citing NEUMANS AND MORGENSTERN, THE
THEORY OF GAME AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR).
220. Salant & Sims, supra note 218, at 1846.
221. Id. at 1847.
222. Id. This set of circumstances defines the game as one of "common knowledge"
which is necessary to predict a rational decision process. Id.
223. Id.
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the game is over and the payoff is the resultant damage sustained by the
plaintiff. Next assume that plaintiff chooses to sue A and B. At this point, it
becomes A's and B's turn to make a move as they are at their first decision
point.224 There are essentially four choice sets that Plaintiff may confront
based on the decisions made by A and B: (1) both can choose to settle- [S,
S]; (2) or (3) one can choose to settle and one can choose to go to court-
[C, S] or [S, C] 225; or (4) both can choose to go to court- [C, C].
Now plaintiff may be at her second decision point. If she is confronted
by option four, the game is over for our purposes and she enters into the
new game-that of trial-where her payoff will be the jury verdict of
$60,000.6 If she is confronted by option one, the game is, again, over for
our purposes, and she will enter into a new game-that of settlement-and
her payoff will be the negotiated settlement price. However, if plaintiff is
confronted with choice 2 or 3, she will need to take into consideration the
rules under Arkansas law with respect to the application of NationsBank.227
Prior to NationsBank, plaintiff could assume that she would recover
the settlement from one party and $30,000 from the non-settling party. 228
After NationsBank, however, the plaintiff would only recover the settle-
ment. Because he cannot aggregate the two defendants' fault-shares, the
plaintiffs own fault-share (forty percent) is greater than that of the remain-
ing defendant's (thirty percent) and thus he can not recover. Therefore it
would be irrational for plaintiff to accept just one settlement; unless both
defendants were amenable and came to a settlement agreement, this case
would go to trial against both A and B.
We can, however, throw an additional wrinkle into this elementary hy-
pothetical game. If the plaintiff can maintain a right for damages, albeit
nominal, against the settling defendant, then she may make a rational choice
to accept a single settlement. 2 9 In this situation the plaintiff would have the
same payoff as she did under the prior law of the settlement plus $30,000
from trial.
In deciding whether or not to accept a settlement, it is reasonable to as-
sume that both plaintiff and defendant will accord some amount to the trial
224. The path that A and B can take will be discussed infra at Part VI.B.ii.
225. For our purposes, both sets are the same as we have assumed under rule 5 that both
defendants are thirty percent at fault.
226. We are still under the assumption of rule three that states the suit is worth $100,000
and rule five that A and B are each thirty percent at fault.
227. See supra notes 35, 92-93, 114, 126 and accompanying text.
228. Prior to NationsBank, plaintiff would have been able to aggregate the settling and
non-settling defendant's fault but only recover for the pro-rata share of the fault thereof.
Thus plaintiff would recover the settlement plus $30,000 which is one half of the damage
allocated to all defendants or thirty percent of the total damages caused.
229. See the discussion of "Mary Carter" agreements supra Part VI.A to see if this is
feasible.
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and the time value of money to come up with a rational decision that works
out in the end to be approximately equivalent to giving the plaintiff
$60,000. In our example, a comparable amount may be $15,000 per defen-
dant. However, this game used rules that will not be known to plaintiffs and
defendants. For example, it is difficult to estimate what fault-share a jury
will attribute to each party. Thus, when playing this game outside of this
model, plaintiffs must take a risk consideration into the fault-share alloca-
tion process, as it can completely change the payoff of the game.23°
Risk considerations are any set of variables that can potentially change
the payoff, or probabilities in any given game.2 31 For example, in our simple
hypothetical, all the rules would present a risk consideration. First, while
there is a good chance that because the tort occurred in Arkansas, Arkansas
law will apply, that may not be the case.232 There may be a chance that Ar-
kansas law will not apply and an attorney will need to take this risk into
consideration when playing the game. Second, the suit's economic worth
can never be precisely determined in advance. Thus, the attorney will have
risk associated with determining the potential recovery. Third, no lawyer
can determine the fault-share of each party. That is a question for the jury
and while a lawyer can estimate these numbers, estimation may be more of
an art than a science, and the risk of estimating wrong will need to be taken
into consideration.
b. Defendants' strategy
The defendants will only be forced to enter the game if the plaintiff de-
cides to bring a cause of action against them. Once this decision is made,
and if the plaintiff is amenable to settlement, the defendants will need to
decide if they will settle. Additionally, if they do settle, what amounts will
they settle for, and what clauses will need to be in the settlement?
First, if either defendant goes forward with a settlement, he will want
to include a reduction in the amount of the damages awarded to the plaintiff
to meet the standards set forth in the Arkansas Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act.233 Once a defendant has settled, his game is over as
long as he has immunized himself against a right of contribution. He can do
230. For example, if the plaintiff determines he can never be more at fault than either
defendant, then he does not need to consider the NationsBank analysis. Alternatively, if the
plaintiff determines he may be more at fault than A, but not B, then he would not likely settle
with B under NationsBank. The plaintiff might, however, settle with A.
231. See infra Part VI.B.3 for a discussion of risk considerations.
232. See Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 628, 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1977)
(adopting Dr. Robert A. Leflar's five "choice-influencing considerations").
233. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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this by getting the plaintiff to agree to a pro-rata reduction of damages
awarded against the non-settling defendant.2 34
In deciding whether or not to settle, however, the defendant may inad-
vertantly enter into a special game theory situation termed the "prisoner's
dilemma., 235 In the "prisoner's dilemma," each player's payoff is dependent
upon the other player's choice. Generally, in the case of the prisoner's di-
lemma, each player can either cooperate or defect.236 Assume, as stated
above, that a reasonable settlement with each defendant would be $15,000.
To cooperate in our hypothetical would be to settle, and to defect would be
to go to court. It has been established that the joint optimum strategy is for
both parties to cooperate [S,S], however defecting is the individually domi-
nant strategy [S,C] or [C,S]. 23 7 Additionally the joint worst strategy is for
both parties to defect [C,C]. See Figure 1 below for a graphic representation
of the choice model confronting both defendants.
Defendant A, Defendant B Settle[S] Go to Court [C]
Settle [] 15K, 15K 15K, OK
Go to Court [C] OK, 15K 30K, 30K
Figure 1
The model in figure one can be described as follows. The [S,S] set
yields a total payoff to the plaintiff of $30,000-$15,000 from each settling
defendant. The [S,C] or [C,S] sets will only yield $15,000; nothing will be
collected from the defendant going to court and $15,000 will have been paid
by the settling defendant. The [C,C] set will yield $60,000 for the plaintiff
because each defendant will be liable for $30,000 by going to court.
234. See model agreement infra Part VII.
235. The "Prisoner's Dilemma" stems from the following story. The District Attorney
speaks to two prisoners separately and tells them that he has enough evidence to convict
them each for conspiracy but it would take some work. So, in order to alleviate some of the
work, the District Attorney offers each prisoner the following deal: "Confess to the crime
and implicate your co-conspirator and you will go free. However, if your co-conspirator also
confesses, you will both do ten years. If you decide not to confess, realize that we will use
your co-conspirator's confession against you in which case you will go to jail for twenty
years. However if neither of you confess, there is enough evidence already to put you away
for five years." As you can see, each prisoner would be best served if he confessed while his
co-conspirator did not. However, if one prisoner confesses and so does the co-conspirator,
then that prisoner will serve more time than if neither had confessed. However, if he chooses
not to confess and his co-conspirator does, he will serve the maximum sentence. Hence the
dilemma, does the prisoner confess or not?
236. Salant, supra note 218, at 1862 n.65.
237. Id.
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In application, if both defendants were to settle, each would be liable
for $15,000, and they would effectively minimize the attorney's fees and
other costs. Under the NationsBank rule, however, the party who holds out
on settlement can effectively go to trial and be released of all liability.
238
Thus, they must make a choice-settle and accept liability-or hope the
other side settles and thus be released of liability. It would, therefore, be in
the defendant's individual best interest to defect and hope the other party
settles. However, in the likely case where both parties defect, the case will
go to trial, and both tortfeasors will be assessed full liability and associated
attorney's fees.
It is also important to note that if a "Party Maintenance" agreement is
struck between the plaintiff and the settling defendant, the settlement should
take the proceedings out of the NationsBank scenario; no prisoner's di-
lemma would then arise. If a potential settlement cannot extinguish a non-
settling party's liability, then the non-settling party's liability is not depend-
ent, and thus no prisoner's dilemma can exist.
3. Risk Calculations in Game Theory
It should be clear in the reader's mind that the previous example was
based on full knowledge of the outcome of the game. Let us now consider
how to calculate risk and gains. In our first example, we will assume that as
one gets richer the utility of each dollar decreases. 9 We thus have a con-
cave utility function, 240 that is, an additional $15,000 is worth less to the
defendant who already has $15,000 compared to the worth of $15,000 to a
defendant who owes $30,000.
Let us now consider the two choices Defendant A has: (1) Settle, or (2)
Not Settle. In both cases, the defendant can "win" or "lose.",241 If Defendant
A chooses to settle, a loss would occur when Defendant B settles and we
can characterize this as a $15,000 lOSS. 2 4 2 Defendant A, however, wins when
Defendant B does not settle and this is a $15,000 gain.243 Consider now the
238. See application through NationsBank supra notes 35, 92-93, 114, 126 and accom-
panying text.
239. This is a rational view of money. One dollar will serve a person with no money
more than it will serve a person with $1,000,000. That is to say the utility of one dollar is
greater for a person who has no money compared to a person who has $1,000,000.
240. Von Neuman and Morgenstem developed a utility theory that in effect explains
what a player gets from playing the game. DUTrrA, supra note 216, at 7.
241. "Win" infers that the defendant maximizes his payoff under this choice route.
242. We are assuming still, that the defendant knows that had Defendant B settled first,
he could not be held liable for any damages and thus 0 (liability if D2 settled) - $15,000
(payout) = <$15,000> (loss). See rules set out supra Part VI.B.2.
243. Here we assume that Defendant A knows he is liable for $30,000 and thus we get
$30,000 (liability) - $15,000 (actual pay out) = $15,000 (gain).
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win-lose scenario for not settling. Defendant A loses when Defendant B
additionally does not settle and is characterized by a $30,000 loss.244 Con-
versely, Defendant A wins when Defendant B settles and this is character-
245ized by a $30,000 win.
Now further assume that we can assign a probability of occurrence and
that in any given scenario we have a fifty percent chance of winning (like a
coin toss). 246 Under the above example, settling puts $15,000 at risk and not
settling puts $30,000 at risk. Thus we can say that settling is "less risky"
than not-settling. If we take into consideration our utility function, we see
that settling will be preferred to not settling. The inequality can be described
as follows where U is utility: U($30,000) - U($15,000) < U(<$15,000>) -
U(<$30,000>). This is further graphically described as Figure 2.
244. Following our general assumptions, we see that 0 (liability if D2 settled) - $30,000
(payout) = <$30,000> (loss).
245. Following our general assumptions, we see that $30,000 (liability) - 0 (payout) =
$30,000 (gain).
246. While this assumption of fifty percent is not justified in any case, it is possible that
where each party knows he is thirty percent at fault, the chance of the other party settling or
not settling can be fifty percent.
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Utility
SM UtilityG m A'
E... E'
...........C .... IA.._^..-, •e -- ] Ch. . i ..... Money
-15K_ 15K
U ility .............
12D'
Figure 2
A= Maximum Utility Gain for Settlement A'=Maximum Utility Gain for Non-Settlement
C= Maximum Utility Loss for Settlement C'= Maximum Utility Loss for Non-Settlement
D= Average Utility at 50% Probability D'= Average Utility at 50% ProbabilityE= Average Utility > than 50% Probability E' Average Utility > than 50% Probability
Figure 2 shows that the average expected utility (D) is greater in the
settlement as opposed to the average expected utility (D') in the non-
settlement choice.
Thus the gamble of settling is "preferred," that is, the utility loss of A
to A' is less than the utility gain of C to C.' Moreover, the average utility
yielded by settling is greater than the average utility of not settling. Addi-
tionally, we can say that Defendant A is averse to risk because, in the long
run, the defendant will lose more by taking the larger risk.247
If, however, we do not assume that the utility of the dollar lessens as
one's wealth increases, rather, utility increases as wealth increases, we get a
convex utility function.248 The inequality can be described as follows where
U is utility: U($30,000) - U($15,000) > U(<$15,000>) - U(<$30,000>).
247. DUrrA, supra note 216, at 441.
248. This irrational view of money can be seen from the following illustration. Assume a
person has the ultimate goal of getting $100. If that individual has $0, then one dollar would
not provide much utility. If, however, that person had $99, then that same one dollar would
provide the most utility.
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This scenario is graphically described in Figure 3 which demonstrates that
the average utility of not settling is greater than that of settling. Addition-
ally, we note that not settling is "preferred" where the utility loss of A to A'
is greater than the utility gain of C to C'.
Utility
A'
Utility
Gain
-15K -D' 15
Money
Figure 3
A= Maximum Utility Gain for Settlement
C= Maximum Utility Loss for Settlement
D= Average Utility at 50% Probability
A'= Maximum Utility Gain for Non-Settlement
C'= Maximum Utility Loss for Non-Settlement
D'= Average Utility at 50% Probability
In the previous two examples, the average expected utility was derived
from our assumption that the gamble was fifty percent. Look again at Figure
2 and note that as the probability of winning increases, the average expected
utility is increased. Moreover one can see that at some point the average
utility of the greater risk (not-settling, E') will be equal to or greater than
that of the less risky choice (settling, E), which is the key to assigning a risk
and probability. Thus, a party is more likely to take the greater risk choice
where the average payoff is equal to or greater than the lesser risk choice.
Moreover, the larger the difference between average payoff of the greater
risk choice and the average payoff of the lesser risk choice gets, the more
likely a party will take the greater risk choice. For example, if a party can
decide that his probability to win is one hundred percent then he will always
choose the greater risk choice.
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VII. THE NEW COMPARATIVE FAULT LAW IN ARKANSAS: ANALYSIS OF
ACT 649 OF 2003
In 2003 the Arkansas General Assembly passed an act entitled "The
Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003.,,249 Among other things, that Act com-
pletely reformed how multi-party-tortfeasor suits in Arkansas will operate.
In general, the Act modified joint and several liability and changed the
method for assessing fault-share for cases arising out of multi-party torts.
The Arkansas act is unique, and, thus, there is no case law interpreting its
application. As such, it is prudent to examine the language of the Act and
determine how it affects multi-party-tortfeasor suits for all actions accruing
after March 24, 2003.250
A. Section 1: Several Liability and Calculation of Judgment
Under Act 649 each tortfeasor's liability is several.25' Moreover, the
several liability is determined by each tortfeasor's own fault-share, and a
separate judgment is rendered against each defendant.252 To determine the
amount of judgment against each defendant, the court multiplies each de-
fendant's fault-share by the "damages recoverable by the plaintiff.,
253
At this point, it is unclear what constitutes "damages recoverable by
the plaintiff' as the legislature did not define that phrase in the Act. The
definition of that phrase can drastically change the amount of judgment ren-
dered against each defendant. For example, assume that a jury determines
the plaintiff suffered $100,000 damages, but, that plaintiff's fault-share was
20%, Defendant A's fault-share was 30%, and Defendant B's fault-share
was 50%. If "damages recoverable by the plaintiff' is defined broadly as the
amount of damage suffered by the plaintiff, then the judgment against De-
fendant A would be for $30,000 ($100,000 X 30%), and the judgment
against Defendant B would be for $50,000 ($100,000 X 50%). However, if
"damages recoverable by the plaintiff' is strictly defined as the aggregate
damages attributed to the defendants, here $80,000 ($100,000 x (30% +
249. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 649 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206 to -212 (LEXIS Supp. 2003)).
250. The General Assembly specifically made the applicability of 2003 Ark. Acts 649
prospective from the Act's effective date. See Id. at sec. 25(a), (b). In addition, the Act con-
tains an emergency clause making the date of the Act's approval the effective date. Id. at sec.
26. The Act was approved on March 25, 2003.
251. Id. at sec. 1 (a). For an analysis of how the Arkansas Civil Justice Reform Act allo-
cates responsibility and compares to the Model Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibil-
ity Act see Robert B Leflar, The Civil Justice Reform Act and the Empty Chair, 2003 ARK.
LAW NOTES 67.
252. 2003 Ark. Acts 649 at sec. 1(b).
253. Id. at sec. 1(c).
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50%)), the judgments against the defendants will be different. Under that
strict construction of "damages recoverable by the plaintiff' the judgment
against Defendant A would be for $24,000 ($80,000 x 30%), and the judg-
ment against Defendant B would be for $40,000 ($80,000 x 50%).
Thus, under a broad construction, each party is liable for its own con-
tribution to the harm. However, under a strict construction of the term
"damages recoverable by the plaintiff," the plaintiffs fault-share is effec-
tively increased. In our hypothetical, the plaintiffs fault-share is increased
by 16%. Furthermore, under a strict construction of the statute, as plaintiffs
own fault-share increases, the plaintiffs obligation to absorb the fault-share
of other parties also increases.254
1. Strict Construction
The Arkansas Supreme Court has thoroughly expressed its views on
statutory construction. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ef-
fectuate the legislative will. '255 When the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, the legislative intent is derived from the ordinary meaning of
the language used.256 Words of the statute will be construed using their or-
257dinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Moreover the
court strives to give meaning and effect to each word in the statute without
rendering any word "void, superfluous, or insignificant." 258 The act is read
as a whole with the purpose of reconciling provisions to make them consis-
tent, harmonious, and sensible. 9
The pertinent sections of Act 649 read as follows:
(b) Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of damages allo-
cated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percent-
age of fault, and a separate several judgment shall be rendered against
that defendant for that amount.
254. To mathmatically determine the effective increase in Plaintiffs fault-share, simply
multiply the plaintiffs percentage fault-share by the defendant's aggregate fault share (P% x
(DA% + (DB% + DC% + . . . )). For example, in the first hypothetical, where plaintiffs
fault-share was 20%, Defendant A's fault share was 30%, and Defendant B's fault share was
50%, the plaintiffs fault-share effectively increased 16% (20% x (30% + 50%) = 16%).
With reallocated percentages such that Plaintiffs fault-share is 40%, Defendant A's fault-
share is 20%, and Defendant B's fault-share is 40%, plaintiffs fault-share effectively in-
creases 24% (40% x (40% + 20%) = 24%).
255. Bank of Eureka Springs v. Evans, 109 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Ark. 2003).
256. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. 711, 718, 42 S.W.3d 496, 500 (2001).
257. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 500.
258. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 500.
259. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 500.
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(c) To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each de-
fendant, the court, with regard to each defendant, shall multiply the total
amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of
each defendant's fault, and that amount shall be the maximum recover-
able against the defendant. 260
Accordingly, section (b) details that a defendant is only liable for his
own fault-share, and then mandates that any judgment be entered against
each defendant severally. Section (c) then explains how to calculate the
amount of that judgment. Read separately, section (b) defines the amount of
judgment different from section (c). In section (b), the amount of judgment
is equal to the damages in proportion to the defendant's fault-share. In sec-
tion (c), however, the amount of judgment is proportionate to the damages
recoverable by the plaintiff.
261
It follows that in order to give meaning to each word of the statute, a
strict construction of the phrase "damages recoverable by the plaintiff' is
necessary. The shifting of monetary burden established by this rule can be
rationalized by looking to the root of modified comparative fault. Recall
that when a plaintiff contributes to the negligence in any degree, the doc-
262trine of contributory negligence is an absolute bar to recovery. On the
other hand, pure comparative fault allows a plaintiff to recover, diminished
by his own fault-share, regardless of his contribution to the fault.263 Modi-
fied comparative fault merged the two doctrines; in that, like pure compara-
tive fault, a plaintiff can recover if he contributes to the negligence. Like the
doctrine of contributory negligence, however, a plaintiff is completely
barred from recovery when his fault-share reaches a certain amount.264 Ac-
cordingly, modified comparative fault draws a bright line as to when a
plaintiff must absorb more damages than that for which he was responsible.
Under Arkansas's model of modified comparative fault, a plaintiff must
absorb all the damages when his fault-share is fifty percent.265
260. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 649, secs. l(b)-(c)
(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206 to -212 (LEXIS Supp.
2003))
261. It should be noted that when a plaintiff is not assessed any fault-share, then the
amount of judgment from section (b) and section (c) are the same. This observation does not
consider the case of a nonparty being assessed fault. See infra notes 264-74 and accompany-
ing text.
262. See supra notes 3-14 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
265. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(b)(1), (2) (LEXIS Supp. 2001); 2003 Ark. Acts
649 at sec. 7. Under Act 649, a plaintiffs fault-share is compared to the aggregate fault share
of all other tortfeasors. See 2003 Ark. Acts 649 at sec. 2(a); see also infra notes 277-281 and
accompanying text.
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Similarly, section l(c) of Act 649 forces a plaintiff to absorb more
damages than that for which he was responsible. While Arkansas retains a
fifty percent bright line bar, section 1(c) employs a progressive allocation of
damages to plaintiffs whose fault-share is between 0% and 50%.266 Stated
more poignantly, a plaintiff who contributes to the negligent act will be re-
sponsible for the damages he causes plus some portion of the damages
caused by other tortfeasors, and when the plaintiffs fault share reaches
50%, he will be responsible for the damages caused by all tortfeasors.
2. Non-parties and Immune Parties
In construing the Act strictly, the court will also be called on to inter-
pret whether the fault-share attributable to a non-party, or an immune party,
is considered "damages recoverable by the plaintiff.,267 In NationsBank the
court made an incredibly strained reading of the phrase "party or parties
from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages," and held that
plaintiff did not seek to recover damages from a settling defendant.26s
Acccordingly, it is prudent to examine how a corollary strict reading of Act
649 will affect suits with non-party tortfeasors or immune tortfeasors.
a. Non-settling non-parties
Black's Law Dictionary defines "recoverable" as "[c]apable of being
recovered, esp. as a matter of law., 269 Damages caused by a non-party are
capable of being recovered assuming a plaintiff could file suit against a non-
party. 270 However, both liability and the amount of those damages is inde-
terminate as the Act states, "[w]here fault is assessed against nonparties,
findings of fault shall not subject any nonparty to liability in any action, or
be introduced as evidence of liability." 271 Accordingly, while fault-assessed
against a non-party is capable of being recovered, it is not recoverable as a
matter of law. Thus, it is unclear whether the liability assessed to a non-
party will be used to calculate the amount of judgment to be entered against
a defendant under Section 1 (c).
266. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
267. The Act mandates the fact finder to consider the fault of nonparties, however, states
that fault assessed against nonparties shall not subject them to liability. See 2003 Ark. Act
649, at secs. 2(a), (c)(3).
268. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
269. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (7th ed. 1999).
270. A plaintiff may be barred from filing suit against a non-party. For example, a suit
would be barred if the statute of limitations on the cause of action had expired. Actions
soundings in general negligence have a three-year statute of limitations. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-56-105 (Michie 1987).
271. 2003 Ark. Acts 649, at sec. 2(c)(3).
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b. Settling non-parties
In some multi-party-tortfeasor cases, it is not uncommon for one or
more tortfeasor to settle out of the suit. Based upon the strict construction of
Act 649, this scenario again requires critical analysis to determine the
amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff. There are three situations
for parties to consider: (1) the good-settling tortfeasor; (2) the even-settling
tortfeasor; and (3) the bad-settling tortfeasor.
A good-settling tortfeasor is a tortfeasor who settles for an amount less
than that which was assessed by the jury in the plaintiff's case. For example,
a tortfeasor who settles for $10,000 ($20,000) in a case where the jury
would have found the tortfeasor liable for 20% of $100,000 in damages is a
good-settling tortfeasor. The even-settling tortfeasor is one who settles for
the same amount that would have been assessed by the jury. Lastly, a tor-
feasor who settles for $30,000 in a case where the jury would have found
the tortfeasor liable for 20% of $100,000 ($20,000) in damages is a bad-
settling tortfeasor. Assuming that a court will use damages caused by a set-
tling-tortfeasor in its calculation of judgment under Section 1 (c), based on
these three situations, the analysis turns to an in inquiry of which amount
constitutes the "damages recoverable by the plaintiff."
In the case of a good-settling tortfeasor, the court will be required to
determine whether to calculate judgment based upon the settlement amount
or liability as assessed by the jury. A plaintiff will likely argue that the
judgment should be calculated based upon the liability assessed by the jury
in order to increase the judgment against a defendant. On the other hand, a
defendant will likely argue that liability should be based upon the settlement
amount in order to decrease the judgment.
Under the plain language of Section 1 (c), only damages recoverable by
the plaintiff are to be considered in calculating the amount of judgment.
When a tortfeasor settles with a plaintiff, that tortfeasor's liability to the
plaintiff is released.272 Thus, the difference between the jury assessment and
the settlement amount are "damages lost" and not recoverable.2 73 Accord-
272. Interestingly, while a tortfeasor's liability to a plaintiff is released after settlement,
he may still be liable to a joint-tortfeasor for contribution. See supra notes 62-64 and accom-
panying text. Under 2003 Ark. Act 649, however, the applicability of the Arkansas Uniform
Contribution Among Torfeasors Act is tempered. See infra notes 296 and accompanying text.
273. Prior to Act 649, judgments against multi-party tortfeasors were entered jointly and
severally. Thus, prior to Act 649, the difference between jury assessment and the settlement
amount was only lost when the settlement agreement provided so. See supra notes 57-64 and
accompanying text. In cases where the settlement agreement failed to provide for a reduction
in damages, the settlement amount is credited to the defendant and the defendant then has a
right of contribution against the settling party. Id.
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ingly, it appears that only the settlement amount would be considered in the
judgment.274
In the case of an even-settling tortfeasor, the amount of recoverable
damages is the same regardless of the calculation method. That is, the jury
assesses damages to the settling-tortfeasor in an amount equal to that of the
settlement. In this case, it does not matter which amount the court uses to
calculate judgment.275
The bad-settling tortfeasor is the mirror-image to the case of a good-
settling tortfeasor. The same analysis will apply and the court will likely use
the settlement amount to calculate the damages recoverable. Although the
case of the good-settling tortfeasor resulted in "damages lost" and not re-
coverable to the plaintiff, this situation does not result in any "damages
gained." Accordingly, the "damages recoverable by the plaintiff' will be the
same regardless of whether the court uses the amount based upon the jury
determination or the amount based upon the settlement. Recall that under
the Arkansas Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act a defendant is
credited with the settlement amount. Accordingly, when a settling-tortfeasor
makes a bad settlement, the defendant-tortfeasor, not the plaintiff, is given
the benefit.2
76
274. Illustration:
Defendant-tortfeasor settles for $10,000 and the jury assesses fault-share to the
settling tortfeasor at twenty percent and to the non-settling-tortfeasor at eighty
percent ; damages assessed at $100,000.
Damages Recoverable Based on Jury Assesed Fault-Share - $100,000 ($20,000
+ $80,000)
Damages Recoverable Based on Settlement - $90,000 ($10,000 + $80,000)
Damages Lost - $10,000 ($100,000 - $90,000)
In this situation we see that the plaintiff absorbs a $10,000 loss for the calculation of
judgment by settling.
275. Illustration:
Defendant-tortfeasor settles for $20,000; jury assesses fault-share to the settling
tortfeasor at twenty percent and to the non-settling-tortfeasor at eighty percent;
damages assessed at $100,000.
Damages Recoverable Based on Jury Assessed Fault-Share - $100,000 ($20,000
+ $80,000)
Damages Recoverable Based on Settlement - $100,000 ($20,000 + $80,000)
Damages Lost - $0
Under this factual scenario we see that the plaintiff is not forced to absorb any addi-
tional damages based upon a settlement.
276. This idea is captured by observing that while a defendant is credited with the
amount of settlement, a settling-tortfeasor does not maintain a right of contribution against
the non-settling-tortfeasor. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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c. Effect of settling tortfeasors
Construing Act 649 strictly will inevitably chill the procurement of set-
tlements in Arkansas multi-party tortfeasor suits. There is very little benefit
for a plaintiff to settle. As in all settlements, the plaintiff will receive imme-
diate gratification; however, by settling, the plaintiff risks a decrease in the
judgment against a non-settling tortfeasor. In addition, similar to the case of
the prisoners dilemma,277 tortfeasors have some incentive to wait for a joint-
tortfeasor to settle and then go to trial. By going to trial after a joint-
tortfeasor settles, the non-settling tortfeasor can effectually reduce any
judgment rendered.
d. Immune tortfeasors
In addition to settling defendants, some tortfeasors are immune from
tort liability.278 In cases of immunity, the courts will again be called on to
interpret the phrase "damages recoverable by the plaintiff." If a defendant is
immune from suit, then, as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot recover
damages from him. Accordingly, "damages recoverable by the plaintiff'
will be limited to the damages assessed to non-immune parties.
This situation can lead to patently unfair results as it allows a non-
immune defendant tortfeasor to ride the coattails of an immune tortfeasor.
The following example illustrates the result:
Illustration:
Hypothesis - Defendant-tortfeasor settles for $30,000; jury assesses fault-share
to the settling tortfeasor at 20% and to the non-settling-tortfeasor at 80%; dam-
ages assessed at $100,000.
Damages Recoverable Based on Jury Assessment - $100,000 ($20,000 +
$80,000)
Damages Recoverable Based on Settlement - $100,000 ($30,000 + $70,000)
Damages Lost - $0
Like the case of the even-settling tortfeasor, when a tortfeasor makes a bad settle-
ment, the plaintiff is not forced to absorb additional damages based upon the settlement.
Instead, we see that the non-settling tortfeasor is afforded the benefit of the of the plaintiff's
favorable settlement.
277. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
278. The State of Arkansas has sovereign immunity. See ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20 ("The
State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts."); but see University
of Ark. for Med. Sci. v. Adams, 117 S.W.3d 588 (Ark. 2003) (explaining that the proper
redress against state action is to file a claim with the Arkansas Claims Commission pursuant
to Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10-201 et seq. (LEXIS Supp. 2001)).
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Fault-share of non-immune tortfeasor - 50%.
Fault-share of immune tortfeasor - 50%
Damages - $100,000
Damages Recoverable by the Plaintiff- $50,000 (50% x $100,000)
Judgment against non-immune tortfeasor - $25,000 (50% x $50,000)
Pour-over immunity - 25%
Under these facts, we see the patently unfair results arising out of strict
construction of Act 649. First, the non-immune tortfeasor is afforded the
benefit of some of the immune-tortfeasor's immunity. In addition, we see
that under these facts a completely faultless plaintiff is forced to absorb
seventy-five percent of the damages.
The law prior to the enactment of Act 649 reaches a better result.279
Prior to Act 649, the non-immune tortfeasor would be jointly and severally
liable for all the damages. It follows that the plaintiff would be entitled to
collect all the damages from a party responsible for injury-the non-
immune tortfeasor.
3. Broad Construction
While the judiciary can rationally support a strict construction of Sec-
tion 1(c), the Arkansas Supreme Court may indeed find a rational basis to
broadly construe the language of section 1(c) of Act 649. The court may
construe the phrase "damages recoverable by the plaintiff' to simply mean
damages suffered.
Courts will construe words of the statute using "their ordinary and usu-
ally accepted meaning in common language. ,280 The supreme court has
held that for a breach of contract, those damages that would place the in-
jured party in the same position as if the contract had not been breached are
"damages recoverable.,, 28 1 Likewise, the court may consider the total dam-
279. Note that under the NationsBank decision, other problems relating to recovery can
surface with immune parties. For a discussion of immune parties in conjunction with the
NationsBank decision, see Crystal Tessaro, NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc.: Law-
yers Can No Longer Bank on Arkansas 's Application of Comparative Fault in Multi-
Tortfeasor Cases, 55 ARK. L. REv. 659, 687-90 (2002).
280. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. 711, 712, 42 S.W.3d 496, 500 (2001).
281. First United Bank v. Phase II, 347 Ark. 879, 898, 69 S.W.3d 33, 46 (2002).
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ages suffered by the plaintiff to be the "damages recoverable" under Section
1(c).
Under this interpretation, application of Section 1(c) is straightforward.
A court will multiply each defendant's fault-share by the damages assessed
by the jury to determine the several judgments entered against each defen-
dant. For example, in a case where plaintiffs fault-share is twenty percent,
Defendant A's fault-share is thirty percent, Defendant B's fault-share is fifty
percent, and the damages are $100,000, the court will enter a judgment
against Defendant A for $30,000 (30% x $100,000) and a judgment against
Defendant B for $50,000 (50% x $100,000).
B. Section 2: Assessing Percentages of Fault
Traditionally, a plaintiff was entitled to compare his fault-share with
282the aggregate fault share of all other tortfeasors. In 2001, however, the
Arkansas Supreme Court narrowed that rule so that a plaintiff could only
compare fault to those parties from whom he sought to recover damages.283
Section 2 of Act 649 has effectively overruled that decision by the supreme
court.
2 84
Under Act 649, the "fact finder shall consider the fault of all persons or
entities who contributed to the alleged injury ... regardless of whether the
person or entity was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit.
' 285
Accordingly, after a settlement, the plaintiff is still entitled to aggregate the
fault-share of all parties responsible for the injury.286
C. Sections 3 and 5: Joint Liability
While Act 649 has provided for several judgments against each tortfea-
sor, it has made some exceptions. First, in cases where one tortfeasor is es-
sentially judgment proof, Act 649 allows the court to jointly increase the
fault-share, and hence the judgment against, a solvent tortfeasor.287 Second,
there is complete joint and several liability for cases where an agent or ser-
vant relationship exists.288 Last, tortfeasors who consciously agree to and
commit an intentional tort are liable jointly and severally.2 89
282. See Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 689, 488 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1972).
283. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
284. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 649, secs. 2(a),
(b)(1) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206 to -212 (LEXIS Supp.
2003)).
285. Id. at sec. 2(a).
286. Compare 2003 Ark. Act 649, at sec. 2 with NationsBank, supra.
287. See generally 2003 Ark. Acts 649 at sec. 3.
288. See id. at sec. 5(a).
289. See id at sec. 5(b).
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1. Partial Joint and Several Liability - Section 3
In section 3 of Act 649 a several defendant can be held accountable for
some of the fault-share attributable to a joint-tortfeasor.2 90 The joint liabil-
ity, however, is limited and subject to procedural hurdles.29' Moreover, be-
cause the partial-joint liability affects the fault-share of a tortfeasor, it indi-
rectly affects the judgment rendered.292
In order to hold a solvent tortfeasor liable for the damages caused by a
joint-tortfeasor, within ten days of entry of judgment, the plaintiff must first
"move the court to determine whether all or part of the amount of the sev-
eral share for which a defendant is liable for will not be reasonably collecti-
ble. 293
After motion by the plaintiff, the court determines whether any defen-
dant's several share will not be reasonably collectible.294 The Act then man-
dates that the court make its decision based upon the preponderance of the
evidence.2 95 Generally, it is the moving party's burden to bring forth a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, in order to get a partial-joint and
several judgment against a defendant-tortfeasor, a plaintiff must be prepared
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the damages caused by a
torfeasor are not reasonably collectible.
The term "reasonably collectible" is not defined in the Act. However,
because it must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the qualifica-
tion is a question of fact. Thus, the trial court will likely have great discre-
tion in determining if a judgment is "reasonably collectible. 296 While it can
reasonably be presumed that a judgment against an insolvent defendant is
not "reasonably collectible," other factors will need to be considered for
cases involving a solvent tortfeasor.297
290. It should be noted that the partial-joint and several liability provided for in section 3
of the Act does not apply to any punitive damages award or judgment. See id. at sec. 3(f).
291. The plaintiff is only afforded ten days to file a motion for an increase in fault-share,
and the plaintiff is required to prove that some damages will not be reasonably collectible. Id.
at secs. 3 (a),(b). See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 248-76 or Part VI.A and accompanying text (interpreting the
phrase "damages recoverable by the plaintiff' used in calculating the judgment).
293. 2003 Ark. Acts 649 at sec. 3(a). Entry of judgment occurs when the judgment is
filed marked or stamped by the clerk of the court. See, e.g., Judkins v. Hower, 351 Ark. 552,
95 S.W.3d 768 (2003); Admin. Order of the Court 2(b)(2).
294. 2003 Ark. Acts 649 at sec. 3(b)(1).
295. Id.
296. Generally a trial court's ruling on questions of fact are given great deference. See,
e.g., Ward v. Williams, 118 S.W.3d 513 (Ark. 2003) (explaining that the appellate courts
review a trial court's finding of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous).
297. A list of factors is beyond the scope of this article, however, a plaintiff may start by
comparing the amount of the several judgment against the net assets of a tortfeasor.
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Once a court determines that a judgment against a tortfeasor is not rea-
sonably collectible, it must increase the fault-share of each remaining de-
fendant. The amount of increase in fault-share appears to be discretionary,
however, and is limited based upon the fault-share attributable to the tort-
feasor. The court shall not increase the fault-share of a tortfeasor determined
to be ten percent or less at fault.298 The court shall increase the fault-share of
a tortfeasor who is greater than ten percent at fault but less than fifty percent
at fault by no more than ten percent.299 If a tortfeasor is fifty percent at fault
or greater, the court shall increase that tortfeasor's fault share no more than
twenty percent.300 A tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff
for any increased fault-share. Accordingly, when fault-share is increased
pursuant to this section, a tortfeasor maintains a right of contribution against
that tortfeasor from whom the court determined was not reasonably col-
lectible.3 °1
Several Liability (SL) Joint and Several Liability (JSL)
SL < 10 % JSL = 0%
10% < SL < 50% JSL < 10%
SL > 50% JSL < 20%
A tortfeasor whose fault-share increases is not without remedy; Section
3(e) of Act 649 grants a tortfeasor whose several share has been increased a
right of contribution from the tortfeasor whose several share is determined
to be not reasonably collectible. The right of contribution, however, is sub-
ject to the tortfeasor first discharging his obligation to pay the increased
share.30 2
2. Joint and Several Liability - Section 5
In addition to the partial joint and several liability provided for in sec-
tion 3, section 5 of Act 649 provides for complete joint and several liability
298. 2003 Ark. Acts 649 at sec. 3(c)(1).
299. Id. at sec. 3(c)(2).
300. Id. at sec. 3(c)(3).
301. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text for a discussion on contribution.
302. The right of contribution is a remedy in form but likely illusory in substance. Recall
that in order for one tortfeasor's fault-share to increase, the damages caused by a joint-
tortfeasor must not be reasonably collectible. Accordingly, if the plaintiff proves that the
damages are not reasonably collectible, it is unlikely that the damages will be collectible
through the right of contribution.
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in two situations. First, if a tortfeasor is acting as an agent or servant to a
party, both the tortfeasor and the party will be held jointly and severally
liable for any damages.3 °3
Second, Act 649 provides for joint and several liability for parties who
act in concert. 304 The Act further defines what constitutes "acting in con-
cert." In order to "act in concert," a party must enter "into a conscious
agreement to pursue a common plan or design to commit an intentional tort
and actively [take] part in [the] intentional tort., 30 5 The Act reiterates that
joint and several liability based upon actions done in concert only apply to
intentional conduct.30 6 Moreover, that Act reiterates that a person or entity
must consciously agree with another to commit an intentional tort in order
to act in concert; providing substantial assistance without conscious agree-
ment is not sufficient.3 °7
VIII. PROPOSAL
Comparative fault in Arkansas is now a bifurcated law-one law gov-
erns acts accruing prior to March 25, 2003, and the other law governs acts
accruing after March 24, 2003. Neither law appropriately considers the
rights of all the parties involved. The law prior to NationsBank worked aptly
for over forty years. Throughout that time, the Arkansas courts aptly applied
the doctrine of comparative fault taking into consideration the appropriate
policies and purposes.30 8 The policy and purpose of the doctrine in Arkansas
is to allow the damages of a tort to be attributed to all the parties' relative
degree of responsibility, and not to deny recovery unless the plaintiffs rela-
tive fault is equal to or greater than fifty percent.30 9 Lawmakers developed
the comparative fault doctrine to allow fault recovery to be fairly distrib-
uted.3 10 NationsBank avoided applying the established policies and purposes
to the facts at bar. Fault should be allocable to settling parties as well as
non-settling parties as long as the pertinent information is in front of the
court and jury. 311 Moreover, a plaintiff should be able to aggregate the fault-
303. See 2003 Ark. Acts 649 at sec. 5(a).
304. See id.
305. See id. at sec. 5(b)(l).
306. See id. at sec. 5(b)(2).
307. See id. at sec. 5(b)(3).
308. See Walton discussed supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
309. See Walton, discussed supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
311. This situation presents a wholly separate issue beyond the scope of this article. The
issue is that once a party settles, its actions are generally not in evidence during the suit.
Thus, the fact finder does not have the pertinent information needed to allocate fault to all
responsible parties and must allocate it solely to the parties appearing before the court. This
problem should be solved by the reduction in damages or right to contribution provided by
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share of all parties whose information is before the court, including those
with whom they have settled with, but excluding those from whom the
plaintiff specifically does not claim damages from for strategic reasons.
312
To hold otherwise is fundamentally unfair and completely inconsistent with
the rationale of comparative fault.
The new law, Act 649 of 2003, returns Arkansas to the prior law of ag-
gregation voided by NationsBank. However, while the Act gives in one
hand, it takes from the other. To alleviate the harsh ruling of NationsBank
the General Assembly could have simply amended Arkansas Code section
16-64-122. 3' 3 Instead, the General Assembly rewrote the law of compara-
tive fault from a blank slate. In doing so, the Arkansas General Assembly
ignored the years of precedent from commentators and other states, and
created a new doctrine with undefined language.
With the enactment of Act 649, it is unlikely that the Arkansas Su-
preme Court will reexamine the language of Arkansas Code section 16-64-
122 to take a second look at the legislative intent and overrule NationsBank.
Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court may limit the NationsBank hold-
ing to the specific facts where the court found that the attorney for Nations-
Bank argued that NationsBank could not recover if the jury found that
NationsBank fault-share was greater than Murray Guards' fault-share.
314
It is also possible under the old law to meet in the middle-a compro-
mise giving effect to the language enunciated by the courts in NationsBank
and the policy considerations set forth in Riddell and its progeny can be
reached. The court should respect future "Party Maintenance" agreements
such as the following:
Assume Johnson is a Plaintiff and Adams is a settling defendant:
1) Pursuant to Arkansas Code section 16-61-205, Johnson agrees that
any judgment entered for Johnson against another party, proceeding under
the facts and circumstances related to this settlement, will be reduced by the
the Arkansas Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See supra note 60-63 and ac-
companying text. Admittedly with a Party Maintenance Agreement under the rule in Shelton,
a jury would be able to hear the information relating to the settlement and can take that in-
formation into consideration when assigning fault-share. See supra note 190 and accompany-
ing text.
312. See Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252, 1260 (8th Cir. 1996). See also supra
notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
313. A palpable legislative amendment would have been as follows:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (e)
(e) Unless a claiming party specifically excludes a party in its pleadings,
any party with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case to which a jury
can assign fault in the verdict is a party from whom the claiming party
seeks to recover damages for purposes of this statute.
314. See supra note 133.
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consideration here paid ($XXX,XXX), or Adams' pro rata share of liability,
whichever is greater.
2) If Johnson should pursue an action against another tortfeasor relat-
ing to the facts and circumstances of this settlement, Johnson may maintain
a right of nominal damages against Adams limited to one dollar ($1.00)
[and if named as a defendant in the action, Adams shall make a good faith
defense].
3) Johnson and Adams agree that if an action should arise against an-
other tortfeasor under the ficts and circumstances relating to this settlement,
the terms of this settlement are discoverable and can be presented to a jury.
This simple solution allows plaintiffs to seek damages against all par-
ties in a suit for acts accruing prior to March 25, 2003. Additionally, it al-
lows for the total fault to be appropriately apportioned. Admittedly, as a
result of the compromise, settlements in Arkansas involving multiple tort-
feasors will likely be "chilled;,, 31 5 however, a little chilling is better than a
fundamentally unfair and inequitable rule of law that conflicts with public
policy.
IX. CONCLUSION
As it stands, Act 649 is complicated and untenable. While the Act al-
lows traditional aggregation, it still chills settlements. By removing joint
and several liability in general, completely innocent plaintiffs are left with-
out a remedy and forced to absorb damages. The Act's allowance for partial
joint and several liability is a feeble compromise. While it allows an inno-
cent plaintiff to increase her recovery against a solvent defendant, the pro-
cedural hurdles set up temper the effect.316 In addition, the Act's haphazard
language used to determine how fault-share and judgments are calculated
requires interpretation.1 7 Accordingly, practitioners have been left with
little guidance on how to advise their clients and appropriately navigate
through a complicated legal problem.
The status of comparative fault in Arkansas is irresolute. Nonetheless,
one thing is clear, for acts accruing prior to March 25, 2003 one law applies,
and for acts accruing after March 24, 2003 a completely different law ap-
plies. Neither law, however, appropriately weighs the interests of plaintiffs
and tortfeasors. The best course of action is to return to the tried and true
doctrine as set out in the 1975 statute codified at Arkansas Code section 16-
64-122.
315. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text for chilling factors.
316. See supra note 291.
317. See supra Part VII.A.
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